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 This research studies the three main economic theories of wage as they apply 
to a specific case study using longitudinal panel data.  The firm in the case study 
pays employees above market wage which presents an interesting opportunity to 
scrutinize the validity of each wage theory.  The economic theories associated with 
the neoclassical school of thought, the institutional school of thought and power 
relationships are each tested for a fit with the case study data.  Relative to the 
neoclassical theory, the efficiency wage theory and agency theory are tested as these 
are the elements of neoclassical thought which support wages above market rates. 
 Two tests are used to evaluate the hypotheses.  The first is a formal 
econometric test of the shirking model of the efficiency wage theory using 
production and pay data at the factory level.  This is made possible because the four 
factories in the case study have essentially the same cultural and institutional 
environment, along with shared production technology and similar product output.  
As such, control is provided for elements other than wage differences between the 
factories.   
 The second test is a survey of plant management.  The survey provides a 
view of both what plant management was trying to accomplish with wage policy, 
and also how effective they felt the pay practices were.  In addition to the survey, the 
culture within the firm is analyzed logically for its connection to pay practices. 
 iv 
 
 This research concludes that for the four factories studied there is no support 
for the shirking model of the efficiency wage theory or agency theory.  As a result 
the standard neoclassical wage theory cannot explain the above market wage and is 
called into question, at least as a generalized model.  In addition, there is substantial 
support provided for the institutional theories around wage as well as evidence of 
the power of the threat of union organizing.  The management survey, the logical 
analysis of firm culture, and the comparisons to the organizational behavioral 
research all support the findings that institutional factors heavily influence wages in 
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 Wages are a keystone of economic theory; thus understanding the wage 
mechanism is critical for both economic and business policy.  Wages are important 
for both the economy and for the individual. For the economy, wages provide a key 
input helping determine the level of employment, a division of income between 
capital and labor, a source of aggregate demand and an element of public and 
company policy.  For the individual, wages provide a means of sustenance, a social 
recognition of an individual’s contribution, and serve as a building block of an 
individual’s sense of self worth.  This research will review the major theories of 
economic wage applied to a specific set of longitudinal data.  These data are for four 
substantially similar production plants owned by Mars, Incorporated over a 10-year 
period.  This specific situation is of interest because at all four sites wages are paid 
above the local market wage rate leading to the question: Why do some firms pay 
more than the market wage rate?  Three connected hypotheses will be tested: 
Null Hypothesis One:  The neoclassical wage theory accounts for the wage 
policy at these four plants for the study period.  
Null Hypothesis Two:  The institutional wage theories account for the wage 
policy at these four plants for the study period.  
Null Hypothesis Three:  The power relationship wage theories account for 





The alternative hypothesis in each case is that the given wage theory does not 
account for the wage policy at the four plants for the study period. 
 A widespread dispersion of wages paid, both vertical and horizontal, is well 
documented throughout industrial countries (Guttschalk & Smeeding, 1997).  For 
example, in July of 2008 management professionals in the United States earned an 
average wage of $43.60 per hour, while fast food counter workers earned an 
average of $9.04 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2008).  Actors and athletes can 
earn millions while others make a minimum wage, sometimes even less.  This 
vertical wage variability is a reality in modern societies.  Suggested reasons for the 
variability include different values of human capital, different training and skills, 
and of course a commonly heard explanation, supply and demand. 
 Neoclassical wage theory suggests that workers doing the same job, even in 
different companies, would be paid the same wage.  In this research the variability 
in wage in the same job will be called horizontal wage variance. The forces of 
competition should press wages and production processes into equivalent 
efficiency. Equilibrium should be achieved as wage adjustments cause employees to 
move between companies until wages for the same jobs are in balance.  While the 
vertical wage difference between the management professional and the fast food 
counter worker is reasonable to many people, it might be surprising to them to find 
that counter to neoclassical wage theory, the same job in the same city is often paid 






 As one example, Table 1.1 shows that in Chicago for May 2008 procurement 
clerks earned the following wages by percentile (Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 
2008).  The top 10% of these workers earn over two times the amount those paid in 
the bottom 10% earn. 
 This research will study production plant workers.  An example for 
production plant workers from the same wage survey is shown in Table 1.2 for 
Chicago team assemblers.  Again the top 10% of these workers earn over two times 
the amount paid to those in the bottom 10%. 
 These examples from Chicago are repeated ubiquitously (Guttschalk & 
Smeeding, 1997).  Further analysis will reveal that this wage variability is not 
accounted for by training, or by marginal productivity, or by any of the standard 
neoclassical supply and demand determinates in the labor market (Uusitab, 2002; 
Lal, 1979). 
 
Table 1.1 Chicago Procurement Clerk Wages 2008 
Bottom 10% Bottom 25% Median Top 25% Top 10% 
11.54 14.12 17.31 20.68 24.51 
 
 
Table 1.2 Chicago Production Plant Workers 2008 
Bottom 10% Bottom 25% Median Top 25% Top 10% 






The question that arises from the empirical data is “Why do some firms pay 
their employees more than the market wage?”  Several theories have been 
offered as possible explanations of this phenomenon.  This dissertation will employ 
longitudinal data to test these major wage theories through the use of 
microeconomic data and management surveys for a single firm operating in 
multiple geographies. 
 
1.1 Wage Theory 
Modern economic wage theories can be found in three general schools of 
economic thought: neoclassical, institutional, and power relationships.  Each of 
these theories will be briefly described in this introduction and then further 
developed in Chapter 2. 
 
1.1.1 Neoclassical Theory of Wage 
 The neoclassical wage theory is derived from a concept of supply of, and 
demand for labor.  Supply of labor is based on an individual’s utility function in 
which consumption and leisure are traded off to maximize utility.  “The properties 
of the supply of individual labor result from the combination of substitution effect 
and income effect.  The combination of these effects seemingly leads to a non-
monotonic relation between wages and the individual supply of labor” (Cahuc & 
Zylberberg, 2004, p. 9). The demand for labor is seen in a wider context.  Labor is 
one of the factors of production.  A firm chooses the combination of inputs, including 
labor, that minimizes its cost of production for the profit maximizing output 





the price that brings these two forces into equilibrium.  The key results from the 
neoclassical theory of wage determination include, for a competitive environment: 
 Homogeneous workers and jobs will receive equal wages. 
 Workers who are unemployed choose to be unemployed as they maximize 
their utility trading off between work and leisure.   These voluntarily 
unemployed workers prefer leisure to the disagreeability of work at the 
available wage. 
 Workers would move quickly and easily between competing jobs when small 
differences in wage rates and job characteristics appear. 
 The reality of labor markets undermines these expected results. The 
dispersion of wages was demonstrated in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 and researched by 
Guttschalk (1997).   Also, involuntary unemployment is a reality across the globe 
and has been studied in detail since the great depression.  And finally workers do 
not move quickly between jobs over small wage differences (Moscarini & Thomsson, 
2007). 
 These empirical realities have spawned a variety of adjustments to 
neoclassical wage theory.  According to Krueger and Summers (1988) there are 
two types of answers to the question of why some firms pay more for the same 
job. First, firms may not be profit maximizers, but rather act according to the 
manager or owners’ alternative agenda. This is called an agency theory 
mechanism. Agency theory is often expressed as a manager maximizing their 
own personal welfare rather than that of the firm and its owners.  The second 





unprofitable to reduce wages to market level. These are efficiency wage 
considerations. Both of these answers however are focused within the rational 
world of homo economicus and orthodox neoclassical theory.  Because these 
theories form an important part of the empirical work of this research they will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.1.2 Institutional and Social Determination Wage Theory 
 Other economists have developed theories basing wage determination as a 
function of social institutions and cultural/psychological determinates.  These ideas 
began with Veblen’s anthropological economic work. 
Wages is a fact incident to the relation of employer and employed. It is, in the 
sense fixed by colloquial use.… The laborer, from the point of view of 
consumption of products, is no longer "laborer": he is a member of society 
simply, and his share of the product of industry is the share of an individual 
member of society. (Veblen, 2002, p. 20) 
 
Veblen tells us that wages are set by social and historical standards and with views 
of equity and reciprocity rather than supply and demand. 
 A key article by Akerlof (1982) brought the idea of fair wage and fair effort 
back from anthropology to economics. According to Akerlof the employer pays a 
wage higher than the going rate and the employee in return exceeds the market 
work standards.  These are seen as a sequence of gifts and counter gifts as would 
also be seen in primitive social organizations.  Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) provide 
a relationship showing that social norms influence productivity and effort at 
equilibrium.  While there are few universal behaviors that can be expected from this 
theory, as social norms will vary by group and over time, the identified institutions 





in a logical way and the specific institutions such as unionism and bureaucratic 
hiring rules can be studied for impact.  The impact of institutions and social 
behaviors have also been studied and documented in work with game theory and 
primitive cultures. 
 
1.1.3 Power Relationships Wage Theory 
 A final theory of wage setting is centered around the power relationship 
between worker and employer.   In certain forms this theory can be traced to the 
“Father of Economics,” Adam Smith.  In speaking of labor and wages and the dispute 
between employer and employee, he says, “It is not, however, difficult to foresee 
which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the 
dispute, and force the other into compliance with their terms” (Smith, 1981 (1776)).  
The words "force" and "dispute" are not synonymous with the concepts of an open 
free market. 
 Perhaps best known in this arena is the significant work that has developed 
around Marx’s theory of social struggle and surplus value.  Marx (1844) states 
“wages are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capitalist and 
worker” (para. 1).     Marx notes that the wage actually paid a given worker may be 
temporarily above or below the normal wage. Supply and demand forces cause 
oscillations above and below a "certain mean." The mean is the "natural price . . . 
determined independently of demand and supply" (Marx, 1891, para 5). 
 While Marx’s theory of wages started with the view that capitalism would 
drive wages to a subsistence level, he asserted  that the average wage is "that 





laborer in bare existence as a laborer," (Marx, 1848, para 22). Subsequently he 
began to add additional items of historical or cultural need to the definition of 
subsistence. 
In 1865, during his address to the General Council of the First International, 
Marx  presented his fully developed theory of wages. There is still a 
minimum limit on wages that is basically a physiological minimum but there 
is no maximum. The  determination of where a given wage will lie … is based 
on the respective powers of the combatants. This seems very similar to the 
class struggle Marx details in the Communist Manifesto. (Bigelow, 1999, Para. 
5) 
 
In Marx’s world the power struggle between the capitalist and the worker over the 
produced surplus value is reflected through the wage.  
 Another area of research that fits into the power struggle group of wage 
theories is the work around union bargaining. A large amount of empirical and 
theoretical work has been developed around union negotiation.  Despite the decline 
in union membership, union bargaining is both historically and currently very 
important to the world of wage setting.  While union density has decreased, 
collective bargaining coverage is still quite high because in most European countries 
collective agreements prohibit differentiating between union and nonunion 
employees.  According to the OEDC (1997) union density for member countries is 
44% but collective bargaining is 68% (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). 
 Bargaining theory can be traced to Edgeworth (1881)  where parties divide 
goods in a pareto optimal way, and then continues with Nash (1951) and Stahl 
(1973) and Rubinstein (1982) where game theory was first explored.  If the rules of 
the game (utility preferences of the players and alternative options) can be 





in many modern economic models.  Models around bargaining have been created 
and incorporated into economic theory.  They include the monopoly union model, 
markup and union power model and insider/outsider model.  These models can 
result in efficient outcomes under certain assumptions (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004).  
Empirical studies suggest that unions do in fact increase wages (Cahuc & 
Zylberberg, 2004). 
 Figure 1.1 shows a graphic outline of the three wage theories discussed and 
the areas where these intersect.  Each of these theories will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
 
1.2 Setting Up the Test 
 The test in this research will employ both case study and econometric 
approaches to determine which of the theories being tested fit with the data.   The 
theories tested include the neoclassical (efficiency wage, agency), institutional 
determination and power relationships.  Efficiency wage will be tested directly 
using statistical regression analysis to determine if productivity is related to wage 
premium.  The other theories will be tested through the use of a management 
survey and aligning each theory’s stylized facts with the empirical evidence based 










Figure 1.1   Model of Wage Theories 
 
 Contributions of this research will include a direct productivity test of the 
efficiency wage proposition. While the literature is rich in terms of theoretical 
discussions of efficiency wage and its implications, the empirical work published to 
date is either at a macro level, with non-US data, with verifiable results or with 
proxies for productivity such as the level of supervision.  Examples of these are 
addressed in Chapter 2.   Production line data sufficient to model total factor 
productivity by factor (resulting in labor productivity) are rare and this researcher 
has not found a case where it has been used in empirical work associated with 





wage, a management survey will be used to test all the wage theories.  The survey 
will provide insight into the motives and results of management practice relating to 
agency, institutional and power relationship theory, and also will provide backup 
and support to the econometrics regarding the efficiency wage test.  The 
management personnel that set wage policy at each plant will be the population for 
this survey.   These individuals were responsible for hiring, firing and achieving 
output objectives.  They studied the information available on wages for their site 
and made the recommendations on wage rates. They also lived with the results of 
the implemented wage policy. 
 This research will also provide new information and insights associated with 
the question of “why some firms pay more than the market wage rate,” as it explores 
management policy and practices regarding the various theories on wage 
determination. In addition, this research will align the economic wage theory with 
the latest in terms of management theory on motivation, finding additional 

















2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
2.1 Efficiency Wage Theory Literature Review 
 Efficiency wage theory is founded on the idea that it can be profit maximizing 
for a firm to pay workers a higher wage than the going market rate.   This theory 
means that a firm’s production costs are actually reduced by paying a higher wage.  
In its most common model efficiency wage theory suggests that all other things 
being equal, effort is a function of wage, and that output is a function of effort.   The 
generally assumed shape for the effort curve is an S shaped curve (Stiglitz, 1976).  At 
the low end of wage, little effort is expended.  As wages increase E’ >0 and effort 
increases rapidly in response to premium wages.  However, a point is reached 
where E’’<0.  Here either the income effect of the high wage takes over, or the ability 
of the worker to increase effort diminishes.  Eventually effort is either flat or 
declines. The Output resulting from the effort is assumed to have a monotonic  
 





  Wage             Effort(wage) 
 






functional relationship and diminishing returns with respect to wage as long as 
additional effort results in some increased output  
  
  
 > 0.     
 
2.1.1 History 
 Efficiency wage theory came out of early work on economic development in 
less developed countries where the links between wages, nutrition and health were 
hypothesized.  Bliss and Stern (1978) and Leibenstein (1957) present empirical 
evidence that increases in the nutrition of workers can sufficiently increase the 
productivity of those workers to outweigh the cost to the employer of the higher 
payment to workers (Weiss, 1990).  
 Based on this "wage to health hypothesis" and related microfoundations,  
efficiency wage theory emerged as a microeconomic explanation of real world 
phenomena that was not appropriately explained with existing theory.   Since the 
time of the great depression and the General Theory, macroeconomics has been 
focused on the causes and reasons for involuntary unemployment and “sticky” 
wages.   But why are wages sticky?  Solow in 1979 described a mathematical model 
where the optimized wage was required to satisfy a condition such that the 
elasticity of effort with respect to the wage is unity.   This mathematical model is 
called the Solow condition and the optimized wage was called the efficiency wage 
(Solow, 1979).  In addition to sticky wages, further labor market phenomena which 
needed explanation included both the dual labor market and wage distribution 
variability for identical workers.  With simple extensions, the efficiency wage 





can be explained by finding some sectors where the efficiency wage model applies 
resulting in higher wages and involuntary unemployment, and some sectors where 
it does not apply allowing for the standard neoclassical results.  Wage distribution 
can also be explained by having firms with different effort productivity 
relationships.  Also of interest during this research certain conditions were 
identified which allow for a high road – low road result to be found within the same 
effort productivity relationship (see Appendix E for this insight and a possible future 
study). 
 
2.1.2 Kinds of Models 
 A proliferation of models occurred in the early 1980s with publications by 
Stigliz and Shapiro (1984), Salop (1979), Malcomson (1981) and Akerlof (1982) 
among others.  Under the heading of efficiency wage theory, four model groupings 
have been created in this research to present the literature used to explain why 
some firms may pay more than the minimum pay needed to attract employees. 
1. They are paid the premium wage in order to minimize turnover costs. If 
firms must bear part of the costs of turnover (search and training), and if 
turnover is a decreasing function of the wages firms pay, there may be an 
incentive to raise wages in order to minimize turnover cost (Salop, 1979). 
2. Increasing wages raises workers' effort level (shirking model). Workers 
who are paid only the equivalent wages of jobs on the outside have little 
incentive to perform well, since losing their jobs would not be costly. By 
raising wages, firms may make the cost of job loss larger and thereby 





3. Workers' feelings of loyalty to their firm increase with the extent to which 
the firm shares its profits with them. These feelings of loyalty may have a 
direct effect on productivity (Akerlof, 1982). 
4. Firms which pay higher wages will find that they attract a higher quality 
pool of applicants. If worker quality is not directly observable, this will be 
desirable (Malcomson, 1981). 
The theorized stylized facts for the efficiency wage model would generally include 
the following: 
1. Pay lower the first year – future increases are an incentive to avoid 
shirking. 
2. Constantly pay above the market rate in each year. 
3. Achieve the labor effort necessary to create above market labor 
productivity. 
4. Lower amounts of supervision can be utilized. 
5. Productive surplus is generated which can be shared between higher 
wages and profits. 
 
2.1.3 The Solow Condition 
 Derivation of the Solow Condition: 
Under efficiency wage theory a firm's output is given by           
A firm’s costs is given by               






This will be optimized by taking the first order conditions for w and L and setting 
them to zero : 
 
   
  
                       
 
   
  
                    
 
solving for w: 
    
     
   
 
       
    
   
 
 This final equation is called the Solow condition and tells us that with 
unconstrained labor a firm will pay a wage where the elasticity of the wage with 
respect to effort is equal to 1.  The Solow condition tells us that the efficiency wage 
is not related to the reservation wage. If the relationship between wage and effort 




 Some of the efficiency wage models suffer from a possible theoretical 
difficulty.  More complicated labor contracts can in fact restore pareto optimum 
equilibrium and return the labor market back to neoclassical standard results 





employment fee, it would provide a substitute nonshirking incentive to the threat of 
unemployment, and also lower labor costs to equilibrium levels.  A number of these 
types of more complicated employment contracts have been proposed including 
bonding, fines and seniority wages.  However, it is possible that more complicated 
contracts are not practical or efficient, given the difficulties in communication, 
interpretation and the resulting misunderstandings (Akerlof & Yellen, 1986).  Also, 
these kinds of challenges to the efficiency wage model result in a moral hazard 
situation for the firm. The firm would have incentive to declare workers as shirkers, 
and collect the bonds, fees or fire senior higher paid workers. This, of course, may 
result in workers being unwilling to accept these more complicated contracts. 
 
2.1.5 Empirical Testing 
 Empirical testing of nutrition and output has been conducted in developing 
countries where below sustenance nutritional levels have been shown to impact 
output.  As previously mentioned Bliss and Stern (1978) and Leibenstein (1957) 
present empirical evidence that increases in the nutrition of workers can sufficiently 
increase the productivity of those workers to outweigh the cost to the employer of 
the higher payment to workers. 
 Another key work is that of Raff and Summers (1987) relative to Henry 
Ford's wage.  Raff and Summers conduct a case study on Henry Ford’s introduction 
of the "five dollar day" in 1914. Their conclusion is that the Ford experience 
supports efficiency wage interpretations. “Ford’s decision to increase wages so 
dramatically (doubling for most workers) is most plausibly portrayed as the 





evidence of  substantial queues for Ford jobs, and significant increases in 
productivity and profits at Ford. Concerns such as high turnover and poor worker 
morale appear to have played a significant role in the five-dollar decision. Ford’s 
new wage put him in the position of rationing jobs, and increased wages did yield 
substantial productivity benefits and profits” (Raff & Summers, 1987, p. S83). 
However, this is not a true data test as the study was only an interpretive study with 
Raff and Summers reading the history and providing their view of its meaning. 
 In developed countries testing the connection between wage and 
productivity has proven more difficult. Effort is not directly observable, especially in 
team efforts and coordinated production processes. How to measure effort has been 
the missing link in previous studies.  Unable to directly observe labor effort in 
common modern team oriented production processes, previous studies have relied 
on indirect measures like the level of supervision (Abowd, Kramarz, & Margolis, 
1999) or on management surveys (Campbell & Kamlani, 1997).  This is clearly a 
weak approach because the level of supervision could be influenced by a large 
number of causal factors other than labor effort.  Included in this group of factors 
could be cost cutting, supervisory capability and effort, and nonremuneration 
related loyalty programs.   Comparable plant level noncurrency data for measuring 
labor productivity is hard to come by.  Most firms track and maintain historical 
information only for required accounting systems while productivity data requires 
collection from multiple tracking systems (hours worked, inputs, outputs etc).  





they summarized and saved in historical systems comparable across plants.  That is 
why the data for this particular study are unique and valuable. 
 
2.2 Institutional Wage Theory Literature Review 
 Lloyd Ulman at the University of California, Berkeley  proposed that the 
development of institutional thought could be described by James Tobin's famous 
statement about market forces i.e.,  "market forces do not count; market forces do too 
count; market forces count for everything" (Kerr, 1977, p. vii). The original modern 
institutionalist, led by J.R. Commons, focused on historical processes and organizational 
practices and as a result stressed how market forces were overcome by institutional 
structure; i.e., market forces do not count.   Newer institutionalists allow for market 
forces and then add institutional rules and boundaries to create a realistic explanation of 
the observed world behavior, i.e., market forces do too count. The traditional 
neoclassicalist would contend that market forces count for everything.  In discussing the 
views of the modern institutionalist some of the ideas and explanations that will be 
covered include: 
 The role of industry structure and the impact of single firm skills 
 The Balkanization of labor markets 
 The two-sector labor market with good jobs and sponge jobs. 
 The concept of sufficient job satisfaction versus maximization of opportunities. 







2.2.1 The Role of Industry and Firm Structure 
 Institutionalist have attempted to find the industry characteristics that lead to a 
firm paying high wages. Krueger and Summers (1988)  show that interindustry wage 
dispersion is large and consistent across time and countries.  Their evidence suggests a 
pattern that some firms pay high wages across and within all occupational groups and 
some firms have low wages across and within all groups (Leonard K. L., 1987). In fact, 
they are led to conclude that "The competitive model cannot without substantial 
modification provide a plausible explanation of inter-industry wage variations" (p. 18).  
This in fact is a specific answer expressed to one of the key questions raised in the 
introduction to this research. 
 Krueger and Summers (1988) argue that there are two characteristics which 
determine whether a firm pays high or low wages.  They are, first, whether or not a firm 
can profitably pay high wages and, second, the level of industry union density.  The 
ability of a firm to pay high wages can be assumed to relate to the intensity of 
competition it faces.  Clearly monopolies, oligopolies and monopolistic competitive firms 
have more ability to pay high wages than do firms in a truly competitive market.  
Similarly, firms with a low percentage of costs tied up in labor have the ability to pay 
high wages. 
 However, this correlation they demonstrate should not be taken beyond what it is 
-- simply a correlation. If the forces that lead to high pay were applied equally across all 
firms, only those firms with the ability to afford high pay would respond to these forces 
leaving the observed result the same. Interestingly, Dickens and Katz find it odd that 





processes where high wages are a tradeoff to high profits (Leonard K. L., 1987).  While 
empirically valid, Kruger and Summers' correlation is not causation. 
 The second characteristic Kruger and Summers point out is the importance of 
industry union density.  Dickens and Katz (1987) show that union density is correlated 
with high wages for both union and nonunion employees.  However, this applies only to 
large firms and not smaller firms, even within the same industry and labor pool (Leonard 
K. L., 1987).  Apparently small firms are either not responsive to the union pressure or 
unions have no interest in organizing the small firms. However, once again, this is not 
causation, only correlation. Unions have tended to concentrate their organization in 
industries that were known to have the ability to pay high wages and in fact already paid 
high wages prior to union organization (Kwoka, 1983).  
 Arthur Alexander is a little more specific in his studies about what industry 
characteristics lead to high wages.  He starts with capital intensity.  Capital intensity 
portends a commitment to the long term and perhaps much industry specific human 
capital.  He also includes product market concentration, size of the firm and unionism as 
referenced above.   
 Not only do industries have specific characteristics but certain firms do as well.   
These could include production skills and techniques as well as behavioral and 
bureaucratic expectations.  The reasons that this human capital would be firm specific 
could include unusual or unique production capabilities and or unusual or unique cultural 
environments.  This would be amplified in a privately run company where owners were 
personally involved such as in the case study for this research.   When developed skills 





attachment.   In this case it is not efficient for either the firm or the worker to shift 
employment.  Since skills already acquired have sunk costs, turnover will not be called 
for even in the case of temporarily reduced demand (Kerr, 1977). This discussion around 
a worker-firm attachment is an institutional version of efficiency wage.  It does not make 
economic sense for turnover to take place and therefore must be avoided.  The difference 




 The term “Balkanization of the labor markets” was introduced by Clark Kerr in 
his famous essay by the same name.  There is no single labor market and the 
fragmentation of the labor market is evident across industries and geographies.  There is a 
natural structure logically within labor markets because of differences in skills, 
geography, preferences and information.  These natural frictions are supplemented by the 
introduction of additional institutional rules which totally fracture the market.  Kerr 
(1977) states, “Institutional rules in the labor market, as we have seen, establish more 
boundaries between labor markets and make them more specific and harder to cross.  
They define the points of competition, the groups which may compete, and the grounds 
on which they compete" (p. 37). 
 Rules can be formal or informal, issued by employers, groups of employees 
(including unions) and government.  Formal rules can be anything from laws against 
discrimination to union contracts concerning providing employees.  Informal rules can 
include demands from the employer such as no moving costs will be paid, to 5 years of 





far reaching dictate of honoring seniority.  Seniority becomes especially important 
because it ties employees to a certain firm or union.  It will provide promotion and 
security and cannot be transferred with employees when they move locations.  These 
seniority rules, in particular, undermine transfers between jobs. And without free and 
easy transfers between jobs the idea of the market mechanism breaks down.     
 The additional impact of these institutional rules and balkanization of the labor 
market is that there are ins and outs.  Those making the rules take care of their own.  
They have created “sovereignty over a job territory.”   Fraternity triumphs over liberty as 
“no trespassing” signs are posted in many job markets (Kerr, 1977, p. 25).  This leads 
directly to a discussion of the two-sector labor market. 
 
2.2.3 The Two-Sector Labor Market 
  The dual labor market theory divides the labor market into two sectors, the 
primary labor market and the secondary labor market.  The primary labor market has high 
pay, stable jobs and promotion opportunities.  It also provides a high return to education 
and years of service (Dickens, 1987).  The secondary market provides low pay, low job 
stability and no promotional opportunities.  The theory further argues that the primary 
market is heavily influenced by institutional factors while the secondary market is 
primarily driven by the free market.   
 The argument has been made that the primary market arose out of the movement 
to oligopolies at the end of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 20
th
 century.   As these large 
oligopolies arose, they turned their attention from short-term competition to long term 
market dominance.  This coupled with a large capital investment sparked the interest in 





offered for seniority and job ladders created, and firm and industry specific skills were 
developed (Reich, 1973). 
 The secondary market controlled by market forces is often seen as relying on 
immigrant labor and product demands that are more seasonal, cyclical and do not require 
the level of capital investment that occurs in the primary market. 
 
2.2.4 Sufficient Job Satisfaction 
 In weighting the merits of neoclassical versus institutional theories against the 
structure of the labor market a key question is does the labor market operate with free 
competitive exchange or are their sets of rules, constraints and norms that dominate.  This 
section will explain the institutional constrains around mobility and flexibility as opposed 
to a free flowing open market.  The vast majority of workers are not actively looking for 
a job.  Some of them may express interest when approached but even then many will 
express satisfaction with their current job.  "They are attached to their jobs or their areas 
as in a marriage contract" (Kerr, 1977, p. 5).  The job may not be the best job in the 
world, but it is theirs! The personal rewards to work are much more than wage. And 
sufficient job satisfaction is not just about avoidance of the real unpleasantness of finding 
a new job match.  The personal readjustments are real and difficult in job transfers but a 
much stronger issue is the alternative reward elements. Workers feel loyalty and 
attachment to their jobs.  They take pride in the progress that has been made in their firm 
and feel an ownership and sense of community with the other employees in terms of 
moving forward.  The job, with its good and bad, often becomes a part of the employees' 
identity and sense of self-worth. Some employees have been known to return to the 





social attachment to their employment.  The primary studies relating to this behavior are 
related to management studies around employment satisfaction and rewards.  The 
behavioral management studies will be addressed in  Chapter 5. 
 
2.2.5 Manager’s Obligation to Employees 
 Managers often view employees as their “team.”  Lee Iacocca’s (1986) assertion 
that “the chairman [of a publicly held company] is morally accountable to his 
employees…” (p.284)  is a far cry from Friedman’s argument that the manager's only role 
is to provide profits to the shareholders (Friedman, 1970).  Much literature has been 
developed on reciprocal exchange and gift exchange.  Managers and employees obtain a 
psychological utility by working with and supporting each other (Kranton, 1996). The 
idea of a manager’s moral obligation to employees is a social cultural norm that can be 
developed within societies and institutions. 
 This idea of “fairness” is supplemented with the idea of social connection.  Not 
only is there a moral obligation but there is also a social obligation to certain employees.  
This connection has even been shown empirically.  “We find that when managers are 
paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected irrespective of 
the worker's ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, they target their effort 
toward high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to them 
or not” (Bandiera, 2009). 
 The works cited above would show the following institutional factors as 
important in wage determination: 
 Profitability or intensity of competition/oligopoly 





 Size of firm 
 Capital intensity of firm 
 Industry or firm specific knowledge 
 Bureaucratic hiring rules relative to experience, personality traits and seniority 
 Sufficient job satisfaction and cultural “marriage contracts” 
 Closeness of managers to workers – social and joint output responsibility 
 
2.3 Power Relationship Wage Theory Literature Review 
 A final theory of wage setting is centered on the power relationship between 
worker and employer.   In certain forms this theory can be traced all the way back to 
the father of economics Adam Smith. In speaking of labor and wages he says,  “It is 
not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary 
occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into compliance 
with their terms” (Smith, 1981 (1776), p. 27).  Adam Smith's use of the words 
“dispute” and “force” are clearly far removed from the neoclassical view of 
dispassionate optimizing of personal utilities on both parties part. Smith is clearly 
recognizing a strong social undercurrent present in economic relationships which 
not only supplements but can overpower the rational optimizing economic man.  
 Perhaps best known in this arena is the significant work that has developed 









Marx notes that the wage actually paid a given worker may be temporarily 
above or below the normal wage. Supply and demand forces cause oscillations 
above and below a "certain mean." The mean is the "natural price . . . determined 
independently of demand and supply." Marx also provides an answer to the 
question, What determines the height of this mean? What forces establish the 
"natural" or the equilibrium wage toward which actual market wages are 
incessantly drawn despite their temporary departure (ScarLett, 2008, para. 5). 
While Marx’s theory of wages started with the view that capitalism would drive 
wages to a subsistence level, he asserted  that the average wage is "that quantum of 
the means of nourishment which is absolutely requisite to keep the laborer in bare 
existence as a laborer" Communist Manifesto (1848, p.1).  Subsequently he then 
began to add additional items of historical or cultural need to the definition of 
subsistence. 
 In 1865, during his address to the General Council of the First International, 
 Marx  presented his fully developed theory of wages. There is still a 
 minimum limit on wages that is basically a physiological minimum but there 
 is no maximum. The  determination of where a given wage will lie … is based  
 on the respective powers of the combatants. This seems very similar to the 
 class struggle Marx details in the Communist Manifesto. (Bigelow, 2008, para. 
 5) 
 
In Marx’s world the power struggle between the capitalist and the worker over the  
 
produced surplus value is reflected through the wage.  
 
 This view of the power relationships would imply that wages going up and 
down would be a result of shifting power.  Power could shift in many ways including 





workers, or legal requirements impacting management approaches to managing 
workers. 
 There is a new and different strain of Marxist understanding developing 
around the labor-capital relationship. This new view argues against two of Marx’s 
key assumptions that end up equating wage labor to slavery and the relationship of 
worker and employer to unavoidable revolution.  This new strain is explained by 
Laycock (1999)  as a view that labor power is not bought and sold as a commodity 
and that its use in creating surplus value is not a mystery to the laborer.  Laycock 
explains that the transaction of providing wage labor to an employer is one of rental 
or lease rather than one of buying and selling and that it does not “masquerade as a 
commodity-exchange (per Marx)” but is fully understood by both employer and 
employee. 
 The result of Laycock’s argument is that exploitation and expropriation of surplus 
value is not tied to Marx’s labor theory of value, but instead is related to the unequal 
distribution of capital and land, or the moral injustice of unequal property distribution.  
This results in a power conflict that is less about the work relationship and wages than it 
is about the class structure of society itself.  According to this view there would be less 
work conflict over wages as employers and employees share many goals at the place of 
employment. Instead there would be more social conflict outside of work.  The impact on 
power relationships regarding wages would be somewhat lessened. 
 Empirical studies have shown that power relationships can make a difference in 





governments have muted and sometimes overcome inegalitarian tendencies.” (Pontusson, 
Rueda, & Way, 2002, p. 307) 
 
2.3.2 Unionism 
 While many of the Marxist discussions are quite theoretical, the academic work 
relating to unions is very much applied. Here bargaining theory, game theory and 
negotiation theory are all about achieving results.  Despite the current decline in union 
membership, union bargaining is both historically and currently very important to 
the world of wage setting.  While union density has decreased, collective bargaining 
coverage is still quite high because in most European countries collective 
agreements prohibit differentiating between union and nonunion employees.  
According to the OEDC (1997) union density for member countries is 44% but 
collective bargaining is 68% (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). 
 Union bargaining theory has developed significantly over the last 2 decades 
and includes new trends in institutions and the environment which are significant. 
Centralized wage bargaining which has been found to be the most effective in 
eliminated wage dispersions is becoming less and less relied upon in the current 
more complicated and global business environment. Movement toward a more 
flexible wage settlement is being used by powerful employee groups and unions 
alike (Pontusson, Rueda, & Way, 2002). 
  Other reasons for the significant change in the approach to union 
negotiations are the significant decline of union coverage in the private sector, and 
also the considerable changes in management approaches.  Clawson and Clawson 





impacts.  Perhaps the biggest management change is the move to participatory 
management. This would include quality circles, team processes and organizations.  
These management approaches solicit worker input and joint ownership of goals 
and results,  which clearly work against animus between employee and employer 
thereby creating a different negotiating environment for unions.  The widespread 
use of these approaches has encroached upon anticompany union rules prompting 
some change to existing regulations.  The other main change that Clawson and 
Clawson identify is the alliances that unions are forming with other grass roots 
organizations, from political action committees to community organizing groups. 
 The main result of the new environment is an attempt by unions to move 
from a servicing model back to a militancy model.  As a servicing model, distinctions 
between labor unions and company unions can be blurred, but as a militancy model 
labor unions can stand independent of company management initiatives (Clawson & 
Clawson, 1999).  These large environmental changes imply that the union 
negotiation process is also in flux and possibly blur the union impact on wages with 
other changes.  
 Bargaining theory perhaps goes all the way back to Edgeworth (1881) where 
parties divide goods in a pareto optimal way, and then continues with Nash (1950) 
and Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982) where game theory is developed.  If the 
rules of the game (utility preferences of the players and alternative options) can be 
described, a best case equilibrium can be modeled.   
 Models around bargaining have been created and incorporated into 





power model.  These models can result in efficient outcomes under certain 
assumptions (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). Empirical studies suggest that unions do 
in fact increase wages (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). 
 The three groupings of economic wage theories each describe a different 
structure and function to the labor market, and as a result end up answering the 
question, "Why do some firms pay more than the  market wage rate?" differently.   
Because the neoclassical theory predicts no differences in wages, it requires the 
efficiency wage theory or agency theory to explain how differences in wages can be 
justified.  These appendages remain neoclassical because they rely on the rational 
man maximizing utility.  The institutional theories can explain the difference in 
wages many ways by referencing the structured rules of the market and the cultural 
and social objectives that participants honor.  The power relationship theories  
explain an above market wage by recognizing some level of negotiating power that 









3. TESTING EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY 
 
 
3.1 Overview of Efficiency Wage Test Methodology 
 Chapter 2 identifies several versions of the efficiency wage model.  The most 
widely used and discussed is the shirking model which relates wage to effort 
(Stiglitz & Shapiro, 1984).  This is the model that will be tested econometrically in 
this chapter.  The other models (the turnover model (Salop, 1979) and the quality 
model (Malcomson, 1981)) related heavily to corporate culture and will be tested in 
the management survey outlined in Chapter 4. 
 The element of efficiency wage theory that has always eluded empirical work 
is the concept of effort.  Employee effort can be readily seen in piece rate or task 
oriented jobs.  However, in most of our modern work environments effort is 
unobservable as large teams work together in interconnected roles to produce 
common output.  This has been the missing link in previous efficiency wage studies.  
Unable to directly observe labor effort in common modern team oriented 
production processes, previous studies have relied on indirect measure like the 
level of supervision (Abowd, Kramarz, & Margolis, 1999) or management surveys 
(Akerlof , 1982).  This is clearly a weak approach because the level of supervision 





Included in this group of factors could be cost cutting, supervisory capability and 
effort and nonremuneration related loyalty programs. 
 This study will avoid the issue of directly measuring effort by looking instead 
at output.  If Output = f(e) and Effort = E(w) then Output = f(E(w)).  It is assumed that 
throughout the relevant range that the first derivative of both f(e) and E(w) is 
positive, giving output a monotonic and positive relationship with wage.   As a result 
wage premium's impact on output can be measured directly if all other variables 
can be controlled. 
 In this case control will be afforded because the production lines used are 
substantially similar.  They are owned and operated by the same company, with the 
same manufacturing philosophy and policy, with the same technology and making 
essentially the same products.  This will allow us to compare communal labor effort 
from line to line based on output.  The only assumption here is that the level of 
effort is necessary and sufficient to raise output if the production processes are 
substantially similar. Because of the direct production information and pay for 
similar lines across multiple geographies,  a production function can be built and a 
tested for the impact of wage premiums on productivity.   
 It should be noted that these lines are continuous flow process lines and are 
not assembly lines.  Assembly lines can manage effort from employees by managing 
the speed of the lines.  Continuous flow process lines do not require employees to 
manually interface with the lines to complete processes.  Their speeds are contingent 
upon the engineering of the line rather than the effort of the associated employees. 





adjustment; they coordinate the timing of supplies and provide quality checks.  Of 
course in times of equipment failure they provide whatever manual support they 
can.  With extra effort they can improve uptime, reduce waste, reduce start up times 
and provide a range of improvement suggestions. 
 The steps in this test will involve first choosing an appropriate production 
function and then testing if wage premiums play a role in the chosen production 
functions. A production function should be chosen first to ensure that the processes 
of the production line are appropriately represented in real terms (no dollars).  This 
will assure that the production function, which may or may not be a good fit with 
the wage premiums included, is an appropriate model.   The specific statistical 
approaches and data use will be discussed in detail as necessary. 
 The other issue of concern goes back to the wage premium of the individual 
versus the group.  At its core, efficiency wage premium is about an economic 
individual responding to personal incentive. Can the output of a group and the wage 
premium of the group be measured in the same way?  If the wage premiums of each 
individual within the group go up and down together, then the incented response of 
the group should be directionally the same as the response of the individual even if 
not identical in magnitude.  As will be explained in the data sections on Mars payroll 
data, and the BLS base pay data, the data are not available for a true individual 
comparison, and of course the ability to measure output (a necessary part of this 
test) is impossible at an individual level given the group dynamics. 
 An overall sense of the group versus individual can be obtained from a 





plants. This comparison is shown in Table 3.1.  The categories of High, Medium and 
Low correspond to the pay zones of employees as explained in the payroll data 
section.  These results show a high level of consistency in movement - all premiums 
increase between 1993 and 2000.  They also show horizontal consistency with 75% 
of the year to year comparisons having the same rank or position of premium within 
location.  Because the data set is small the standard deviation is large.  A statistical 
comparison would show all the data points within the same 95% confidence 
interval, however this is not particularly meaningful as the interval would also 
include negative wage premiums.   The consistency of the data within and between 
the groupings gives support to the idea that group wage premiums can be used 
along with group output to measure the production input of the wage premiums. 
 
3.2 Plants and Data 
3.2.1 Manufacturing Plants 
 The manufacturing plants used in this study have been selected from four 
cities, Albany Georgia, Cleveland Tennessee, Chicago Illinois and Waco Texas.   
Cleveland Tennessee is near Chattanooga and will be referred to as Chattanooga in 
the rest of this study. These cities represent a diverse set of locations. None are 
 
Table 3.1 Wage Premium by Pay Zone 
 
WACO ALBANY CHICAGO CHATTANOOGA 
 
1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000 
HIGH 23% 47% 10% 42% 7% 15% 28% 36% 
MEDIUM 51% 61% 52% 59% 24% 55% 36% 81% 






especially high income areas (normal for the location of manufacturing plants).  But 
Chicago and Chattanooga enjoy significantly higher income and are larger cities than 
either Albany or Waco.  Chicago is heavily unionized with a significant 
manufacturing base.   The other locations do not have a strong union presence.  Each 
area has a sufficient manufacturing base and civilian labor force to provide a 
competitive labor environment.   While smaller, Albany has a major Coors brewery 
and Procter and Gamble, and Waco has Raytheon, Cargill and Pilgrim’s Pride among 
other manufacturers.  The location demographics are shown in Table 3.2. 
 The plants are all well established and range in age from over 60 years old to 
over 30 years old.  A number of the plant production workers at each site have been 
employed for 20 years or more.   During the 1990s each plant was operated by a 
senior management team composed of a plant manager, an engineering director, an 
operations manager and a finance and human resource manager.  The Albany  
 
Table 3.2  Location Demographics 
 
ALBANY CHATTANOOGA CHICAGO WACO
GEORGIA TENNESSEE ILLIOIS TEXAS YEAR SOURCE
City Limits 
Population 72,092        153,487            2,661,688 108,689     2006 Fact Sheet
Metro Area  
Labor Force 54,000        235,039            4,137,250 101,874     2000 EEO Data Tool
Mfg Firms with 
>20 Employees 70                 370                     2,185          153              2007 Economic Census
Median Family 
Income 38,772        50,282               53,381        39,791        2008 Fact Sheet
Median FI Ratio 
to US average 61% 80% 84% 63% 2008 Fact Sheet
Labor Force 
College Graduate 22% 24% 30% 19% 2006 Fact Sheet





plant was built originally to process peanuts for use in other plants, but also now 
has lines that produce filled pretzels and sugar candy.  Chattanooga is a very large 
plant that makes a variety of M&Ms candies and Twix bars.  Chicago makes a variety 
of filled bars including Snickers, 3Musketeers and Milky Way Bars.  Waco produces 
Snickers bars and sugar candy under the brand names Starburst and Skittles.  Each 
plant also has a chocolate plant that turns chocolate liquor, cocoa butter, sugar and 
milk into finished chocolate. 
 The basic production technologies have been in place for many years at each 
plant.  However new technologies are added into the lines to improve quality or 
efficiency every year.  Most of these base technologies can be purchased off the shelf 
in ready assembled lines.  However the off the shelf lines would be much smaller 
and would not operate to the level of specifications that the Mars lines have been 
built up to over the years.  The technologies can be grouped as bar lines, chocolate 
plants, sugar lines and shell coated products.  
 Bar lines produce such products as Snickers, Twix and Milky Way in a variety 
of sizes and packages.  The lines are long continuous processes.  Nougat, caramel 
and other ingredients are continuously cooked and formed into a slab on a moving 
conveyor belt where the product is cooled, sliced, chopped to size and then enrobed 
in chocolate, decorated and cooled.  Given the need to heat and cool the product, the 
lines can be physically quite long so that the temperature changes can be achieved 
without slowing the line down.  Wrapping is done in high speed single lanes and 
then the product is bagged or placed in a carton and then put in a case and on a 





 The role of employees in working on these lines is to observe the operation 
of the equipment, to adjust speeds and settings and to address emergencies. 
Additional employees provide the continuously needed supplies and maintain and 
repair the equipment.   From time to time mechanical problems arise which require 
manual intervention until the problem can be fixed. 
 Chocolate plants are highly automated and  require primarily servicing of the 
equipment and supplies.  The sugar lines have very automated processes but 
require significant manpower in forming and packaging due to the wide variety of 
packaging and the very high speeds at which the small pieces are processed. 
 Coated or shelled products include M&Ms and Skittles.  These products are 
originally formed as a sheet of nibs or lentil shaped centers.  These nibs are turned 
in a coating pan batch process while multiple layers of sugar shell are applied.  The 
coating process is very technically sensitive to temperature and humidity and 
requires close monitoring by employees.  Additional capital is required to process 
multiple colors/flavors until final blending. The high speed packaging machinery 
also requires a significant number of employees to monitor and maintain during 
operation.   
 The process lines all exhibit certain characteristics.  They operate with a 
variable relation between capital and labor.  For all the lines labor can change as 
shifts change, for example, from three staffed shifts to four while capital remains 
constant.  Also problems or improvements can be addressed with only labor or 
capital rather than always requiring equal amounts of both. The capital and labor 





without employees and employees cannot produce the product without capital.  
However, additional capital can replace employees, or additional employees could 
be used for some operations instead of automating. 
 Because the lines are very large and expensive, additional capacity is 
regularly achieved by eliminating bottle necks with capital or labor instead of 
building new lines.  New lines are added only irregularly.  The data for this study 
include 23 lines, and during the 10-year period three lines are retired and three 
lines are started. 
 Because the lines are well established and operate in a consistent range of 
capacity, over the period of the study, a single return to scale is appropriate 
regarding labor and capital, rather than a life cycle concept of multiple returns to 
scale.  Labor and capital are added to the lines in small increments of a few 
percentage points difference per year rather than fundamental changes in 
operations.  The large changes are achieved by adding or subtracting shifts of 
operation which is near a constant return to scale relative to labor but requires no 
additional capital.   
 The data used in the efficiency wage test come from two sources, first payroll 
files from the plants and second centralized production reporting, gathered from the 
plants. 
 
3.2.2 Payroll Data 
 During the study period Mars placed all nonexempt jobs within a pay zone. 
While five zones exist, the vast majority of employees operate from within three 





has several steps of pay (approximately four).  Employees (called associates by 
Mars) are paid at one of the steps within the zone for the job they have.  Over time 
an associate can move up the steps within their zone as long as they are performing 
well.  Once an associate reaches the top step in the zone they will receive no more 
pay increases unless they are promoted to a different job at a higher zone, or the 
company changes the pay scale within the zone.  Since turnover is low, over time 
most associates working within the same job end up being paid at the top of the 
zone and are paid the same amount.  It is common to see the same pay for multiple 
associates at each site.  Payroll is made weekly and the payroll process is conducted 
at each individual plant.  The data available for this study are associate number and 
hourly pay for all nonexempt employees from each plant’s payroll.  This does not 
include benefits, vacation or bonuses.  But this base amount is the correct amount to 
compare to the Bureau of Labor statistics hourly pay surveys because the 
government data also do not include these benefits.  There is one small wrinkle in 
the Mars payroll data.  The plants all pay their associates a 10% bonus if they are 
ontime for work.  This is paid out with the weekly pay over 95% of the time and is 
thought of by the employees as part of their pay.  While the raw numbers will 
remain unchanged, in calculating pay premium versus average local pay the on-time 
pay bonus will be included.  A summary of pay data by site is shown in Tables 3.3 
and 3.4 and in Figure 3.1.  Average pay is the average hourly rate of all nonexempt 







Table 3.3 Mars Payroll Data 
 
 






CHICAGO Headcount Wage Headcount Wage Headcount Wage Headcount Wage Headcount Wage
Average 462 13.69 489 14.74 386 18.87 418 18.88 448 20.33
High Wage 19.17 20.22 23.93 24.29 26.11
Low Wage 9.16 9.86 13.22 12.94 12.44
 
CLEVELAND
Average 517 12.04 522 12.95 657 15.27 635 15.87 666 17.09
High Wage 15.74 16.43 19.48 19.78 21.26
Low Wage 6.36 6.36 8 11.47 10.95
 
WACO
Average 582 12.02 635 12.33 709 14.43 755 14.2 666 14.16
High Wage 15.99 16.72 20.48 21.83 24.64
Low Wage 7.27 7.27 6.27 6.77 7.27
 
ALBANY
Average 291 12.93 296 13.83 306 16.63 319 16.72 281 16.96
High Wage 16.45 17.63 20.87 21.18 22.77
Low Wage 8.99 9.63 9.24 12.77 10.08
1993 1994 2000 2001 2005
1994/1993 2000/1993 2001/2000 2001/1993 2005/2001
Chicago 7.7% 4.7% 0.1% 4.1% 1.9%
Cleveland 7.6% 3.5% 3.9% 3.5% 1.9%
Waco 2.6% 2.6% -1.6% 2.1% -0.1%






Note:  estimates between the data points are straight-lined. 
Figure 3.1 Average Pay by Plant 
 
 
3.2.3 Production Data 
 One of the company’s owners was a trained engineer.  He also believed very 
strongly that lasting competitive advantage could only be obtained through 
manufacturing excellence and technology.  As a result he required every plant to 
submit engineering plant performance along with financial data.  The unique data 
are available for approximately a 10 year period in the company’s centralized 
historical repository.  Mars calls this information the A30 report.  The report was 
filled out by the financial employees at each site with input from the site engineers.  





from the financial records, while things like standard operating capacity would be 
provided by the engineers.  The key pieces of data used in this study end up being: 
 Output (Q) is measured in metric tonnes.  A metric tonne is approximately 
2204 lbs.  While a tonne of Snickers bars may not have the same dollar value as a 
tonne of M&Ms it would be a consistent output variable within types of lines and 
even across lines relative to the inputs.  The metric used is yearly total output 
moved into finished goods (this excludes any waste or rejected product). 
 Headcount (L) is reported in equivalent full time people and is tracked 
through the payroll system.  The number used is the average of weekly headcount 
for the year.  
 Standard operating capacity (K) is also measured in metric tonnes.  A 
consistent set of rules is used by all plant industrial engineers to calculate the 
standard operating capacity.  Standard operating capacity is used as a proxy for 
capital because of several reasons.  The first is that dollar value of capital is recorded 
in the accounting records at cost and so equipment that is 30 years old would not 
have a comparable value to recently added equipment.  The second is that much of 
ongoing capital spending is related to issues of safety and quality which do not affect 
output quantities.  Standard operating capacity shows the impact on output quantity 
of capital used on the line without regard to labor. 
 The following chart, Figure 3.2, shows the data points relating output tonnes 
to standard operating capacity for all lines. This chart demonstrates a consistent 







Figure 3.2   Output and SOC 
  
 The next chart, Figure 3.3,  shows the data points relating output tonnes to 
headcount for all lines.  Because there is a very limited relationship R squared of 7% 
it is apparent that the production lines have different headcount relationships.   The 
next two graphs, Figures 3.4 and 3.5,  show the same data limited to Bar Lines and 
Shell Coating lines which gives a much improved relationship (R squared 28% and 
83%).   These figures demonstrate that the different technology groups have 
different headcount relationships. In order to capture this difference the fixed 
effects technique using lines as a grouping proves beneficial in the econometric 
production modeling.  
 The following chart, Table 3.5, shows the data that are available for use in the 
study, by line by year and a range for each of the data points.  This demonstrates the 

















Figure 3.5  Shell Coating - Output and Headcount 
 




Plant Line DATA Volume Assets Labor K/L Y/L
Albany Baked Filled Ln 1 93-2002 122% 74% 33% 34% 106%
Albany Baked Filled Ln 2 93-95 22% 24% 13% 9% 29%
Albany Peanut Process 83-2002 21% 55% 49% 99% 67%
Chicago Filled Bar Ln 1 Fs/S 93-2002 82% 115% 132% 39% 54%
Chicago Filled Bar Ln 2 Sng 93-2002 81% 122% 73% 49% 32%
Chicago Filled Bar Ln 3 Snck 93-2002 143% 84% 237% 266% 136%
Chicago Chocolate Plant 93-2002 18% 98% 61% 102% 44%
Cleveland Flex Line 93-2002 114% 63% 89% 31% 180%
Cleveland International 93-2002 231% 20% 700% 684% 224%
Cleveland M&M Peanut 93-2002 18% 29% 18% 30% 35%
Cleveland M&M Plain 93-2002 77% 60% 48% 37% 40%
Cleveland Twix I 93-2002 594% 22% 119% 118% 416%
Cleveland Twix II 95-2002 500% 55% 120 71% 173%
Cleveland chocolate Plant 93-2002 48% 37% 61% 69% 63%
WACO Line 1 95-2002 122% 63% 57% 123% 134%
WACO Line 2 Snickers 93-2002 30% 133% 70% 55% 53%
WACO Starburst 93-2002 80% 87% 55% 113% 101%
WACO Skittles 93-2002 64% 32% 35% 60% 81%
WACO Chocolate plant 93-2002 24% 90% 59% 95% 87%
Source Mars A30 production reports 1993-2002





3.3 Choosing a Production Function 
 The purpose in this study of choosing a production function is to allow a 
drilled down look into the role labor plays in producing output as a basis for testing 
the efficiency wage theory.  Efficiency wage theory suggests that all other things 
being equal, effort is a function of wage, and that output is a function of effort.  The 
Output shape resulting from the effort is assumed to have a similar shape to a 




 > 0, with diminishing returns.     
 A production function must be selected that provides a reasonable 
explanation of labor’s role in the output process so that the theories around wage, 
effort and output can be tested.   Given a production function, the role of labor can 
be defined mathematically with a marginal product of labor, a technical rate of 
substitution and the elasticity of substitution.  The selection of the function will be 
accomplished using a two-step process. 
 Step 1 :  Pick a functional form that logically matches the design 
characteristics of the production lines being tested. 
 Step 2:  Run regressions of the various acceptable models to see which ones 
provide the best empirical fits.  The judgment of functional fit is usually 
accomplished by measuring residual errors as either root mean squared errors or 
mean absolute percentage errors (Wilson, 2009).  In addition the coefficients will be 







3.3.1 Step One - Logical Match 
 The various functional forms for production functions have different 
characteristics built into the mathematics.   These would include the inputs coming 
in fixed or variable proportion and being either complements or substitutes.  The 
functional form would also include the returns to scale being limited to a single form 
or having the ability to change from diminishing returns to increasing returns 
within the same function.  The features of difference would also include how 
technology and scale are applied to the process.  For a more complete discussion of 
the features of various production functions refer to Appendix D.   Please also refer 
to the description of the Mars production lines and the data in the previous section. 
The features of the Mars production lines being studied would clearly include: 
a. having variable proportions of inputs possible and  
b. the inputs can act as either substitutes or complements and  
c. a single return to scale (approximately constant) would be used 
through the entire production function.  
 Given the above we can eliminate Leontief and Additive1 production forms 
from consideration.  We are left with Cobb-Douglas, Constant Elasticity and 
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3.3.2 Step Two - Empirical Fit 
 The data are all in physical measures with no dollar values.  Production 
tonnes are used for volume, standard operating capacity is used as a proxy for 
capital2 and equivalent headcount is used to measure labor.  The data are edited for 
obvious errors in the standard operating capacity (see data description section for 
detail).  No production lines have been eliminated for the overall fit even though 
some of them have high estimated errors. 
 There are several options which can assist in fitting the functional forms.  
Simple linear regression can be used, or panel data techniques can be used.  Because 
the data are structured by years for each line and plant, the data fit the classical 
panel data format.  Classical linear regression and nonlinear techniques will give a 
slope and intercept that fits the data as a whole.   However there may be different 
relationships within an individual plant or line (panel data structure) that are 
“averaged” with this classical approach. This difference has been previously 
referenced in the data section of this chapter. The different effects that lines or 
plants might have on the relationships can be teased out using panel data 
techniques called fixed or random effects.   It can easily be confirmed that the 
relationships within a plant or line are significantly different from the overall data 
relationship with the following example.  Table 3.6 shows the correlation coefficient 
between volume and headcount for the overall data and for two specific lines. 
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 If dollars were used to measure capital, then there would be issues with age of the assets and accounting 







Table 3.6  Correlation Between Volume and Headcount 
Data Set OLS coefficient  t statistic 
Overall .0788 3.98 
Chicago Line 1 .1095 8.15 
Waco Chocolate -.247 2.35 
 
Table 3.6 shows significant, (t statistic) but very different, relationships.  These 
differences should be captured in the econometric fits of the production function.  
 The fixed effect model for the Cobb-Douglas form is as follows: 
Ln (volume)it = Ln(technology) + αLn(Capital) it + βLn(Labor) it   +C i  + ε it 
Where i represents the fixed effect group and t represents time.  Here Ci represents 
the impact of the specific group.  This essentially allows for a different intercept 
(technology) for each group.  A further test can be conducted to determine if the 
dummy variables add significance to the resulting equation. 
 Random effects are based on a different assumption.  This technique assumes 
that the data are a sample from a normally distributed population. As such the error 
term could be different within each grouping. The most likely error terms by group 
are calculated. 
 The random effect model is as follows: 
Ln (output)it = Ln(technology) + αLn(Capital) it + βLn(Labor) it   +u i  + ε it  where ui is  
normally distributed.  An equivalent interpretation is that the fixed Ci's are 
distributed along a normal distribution. 
 In deciding whether random or fixed effects is a better way to capture the 
group impact from the data, Greene (2010) identifies some key differences as: 





o Small number of parameters 
o Efficient estimation 
o Restrictive assumption for independence of errors. 
 Fixed Effects 
o Robust – generally consistent 
o Large number of parameters (can handle without losing degrees of 
freedom) 
The heart of the problem in deciding between fixed and random effects is whether 
the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms – endogeneity.  If 
there is any correlation then fixed effects are preferred because random effects are 
not consistent.    
 Fixed effects is preferred for this exercise for several reasons:   
1. The data set is structured as a population rather than a random sample 
2. The number of groups is small (4 plants and 21 lines) 
3. The assumption of normality may be suspect given the limited data points 
per line 
The fixed effects group used will be production line allowing for a different intercept 
to account for differing technical and structural differences by production line. 
 Another approach which will be used in the fitting process is to fit all the 
functions in a natural logarithmic form.  The Translog production function is already 
in a logarithmic form.  Cobb-Douglas will need to be linearized by converting to 
logarithmic form in order to use least squares regression.  Constant Elasticity cannot 





Cobb-Douglas and Translog forms will be solved using logarithmic formats it is 
important that all of the equations do so. The estimates, residuals and the R squared 
results cannot be compared if some equations have the dependent variables as a 
natural log transformation and others do not.  Wooldridge (2009) explains the 
importance of this by showing that the exponent of the predicted log Ŷ will 
systematically underestimate the expected value of Y.   
 The statistical description of the data used for these empirical fittings is 
shown in Table 3.7.  Given the statistics for Kurtosis and Skewness we will not reject 
the hypothesis that the data follow a normal distribution.  
 
3.3.2.1 Cobb-Douglas Functional Fit 
 The Cobb-Douglas is perhaps the most common production functional form 
used.  It provides for a complementary relationship between capital and labor and  
 
Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for 10 Years of Production Data 
 
VOLUME SOC HEADCOUNT
Mean 27.5 39.4 115.6
Standard Error 1.3 1.9 4.3
Median 29.0 36.9 121.0
Mode 33.3 13.8 136.0
Standard Deviation 17.7 26.9 61.1
Kurtosis -0.3 -0.2 0.2
Skewness 0.4 0.7 0.3
Range 72.8 100.0 304.0
Minimum 0.7 2.9 3.0
Maximum 73.5 102.9 307.0





will provide an output of zero if either capital or labor is zero.  However, the Cobb-
Douglas form forces the function to have a constant elasticity of substitution of 1.  
Because there is no reason to assume that this restriction is appropriate for our 
dataset, this constraint may limit the results of this model from achieving the best 
possible fit.   The regression model for Cobb-Douglas is fit using logs of all data 
because of the nonlinear structure of the format. 
Ln (output) = Ln(technology) + αLn(Capital) + βLn(Labor) + ε 
The resulting Fixed Effect equation converted back into standard form is as follows: 
                      
 The technology factor is .226 (average of fixed effects) 
 The exponents add up close to 1 which implies constant returns to scale. This 
can be tested as follows:   F(  1,   154) =    0.58 Prob > F =    0.4492 as a result 
the hypothesis that the coefficients equal 1 cannot be rejected. 
 R squared is 90% 
 The statistical significance of the exponents and intercept are high, above 
99%. 
 The coefficients and t statistics are shown in Table 3.8 
Another key test for the fixed effects model is to determine if the model with fixed 
effects is more significant than without.   This significance can be confirmed with the  
 
Table 3.8 Cobb-Douglas Estimates 
Coefficient Estimate    t  statistic 
Capital exponent 0.698 8.15 
Labor exponent .457 9.04 





F test of the hypothesis that all fixed effects are zero: F(22, 174) =  9.4  Prob  = 
0.0000.  Clearly the Fixed Effects add explanatory power to the model. 
 
3.3.2.2 Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functional Fit 
 Volume                           
 The Constant Elasticity of Substitution functional form is also commonly 
used.  It has fewer constraints than the Cobb-Douglas because elasticity of 
substitution is not restricted to 1.  However, it is required to be constant throughout 
the entire function.  This restriction may also prevent us from achieving the best 
possible fit. The Constant Elasticity of Substitution Function exhibits constant 
returns to scale if B3 in the function above is equal to 1.  The Constant Elasticity form 
also contains several well know functional forms within it.  If B3 and B2 are both 
equal to 1 then the isoquant is a straight line defining a linear production function.  
If B2 approaches zero then the form will take a Cobb-Douglas form (Varian, 1992).  If 
B2 approaches negative infinity then the form will take a Leontief form of perfect 
complementary inputs. 
 Using a nonlinear iterative function which minimizes the sum of squared 
residuals the following equation was derived for the Constant Elasticity Production 
Function. 
Ln version of CES:    ln volume  ln      
  
   
 ln                      
RESULT:    ln volume  ln          
    
     
 ln                  L      
Converted into standard format: 





The important elements in this function include the following: 
 The scale factor .1518.  
 The weight of factor inputs – here capital is given a heavy weight of 91.2 
while labor has only a 8.8 weight. 
 The coefficient B2 used to calculate the constant elasticity of substitution 
factor is 1.141.  This would imply an elasticity of substitution of  
 
 
       
      
 
 A negative elasticity of substitution is meaningless and results from the fact 
that this equation assumes concavity in the function and in this case the 
function is convex (Mos-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995).  Because this 
factor is close to 1 (1.141) we have an almost flat plane in three dimensional 
production space. However, there is some curve, it is just small. 
 If B3 were equal to 1 then the function would have constant returns to scale.  
Because B3  is more than 1 (1.32) we have increasing returns to scale. 
 Despite the previously mentioned objectionable theoretics, this function has 
a very good fit, as identified by a 99% adjusted R squared which means 99% 
of the deviation from the average output is explained by the estimated 
equation. 
 The t statistics for the derived coefficients also provide a high level of 
confidences (99%) 





 Table 3.9  Constant Elasticity Estimate 
Coefficient Estimate  t statistic 
Scale Factor .1518 18.25 
Factor Weight .912 32.24 
Rho 1.141 4.95 
Adjuster 1.32 4.91 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Translog Functional Fit 
 The Translog functional form is a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas form; it 
does not assume constant elasticity or returns to scale. The Translog functional 
form is very flexible as it has both linear and quadratic terms along with a cross 
product.  This form permits the elasticity of substitution between inputs to vary.   
 Also the elasticity of scale can vary with output and factor proportions 
permitting the long run average cost curve to take the traditional U shape 
(Weins, 2010). 
 Because of its flexibility and lack of constraining assumptions the translog 
production form has become popular in current econometric work.  
The translog production function in standard two input format is as follows: 
                     1Ln(Capital)+B2Ln(Labor)+B3 Ln2 (Capital)  + B4 
Ln2(Labor) + B5Ln(Capital) ×Ln(Labor) 
The results of the regression are as follows: 
                         (Capital)-.537Ln(Labor)+.0227 Ln2 (Capital)  + .206 
Ln2(Labor)  -.233Ln(Capital) ×Ln(Labor) 





 The F test (5,171) that all coefficients are equal to zero gives a probability of 
.0000. 
 Most, but not all of the t statistics on the coefficients are significant. 
The coefficients and t statistics are shown in Table 3.10. 
 In order to have constant returns to scale the conditions outlined in Table 
3.11 must be met (Bairam, 1998): 
 This fit does not yield constant returns to scale.  Also, this fit has an 
unreasonable area of the curve where if capital is very high and labor is very low the 
marginal product of labor will be negative.  While this does not happen normally in 
our current data set, it does not seem to be a particularly meaningful portion of the 
curve.  
 
Table 3.10  Translog Estimate 
 Coefficient  t Statistic 
Capital 1.669 4.16 
Labor -.5378 2.95 




Cross product -.233 2.83 
Constant -1.247 2.05 
 
 
Table 3.11  Translog Constant Returns to Scale 
Condition Results F Test probability  
 1+B2 = 1 1.669 -.5378 = 1.13 is close  not equal to 1 73.3% 
- B3=B1 -.0227= is not equal to 1.669 0.00% 







3.3.2.4 Additive Production Function 
 Previously the additive production function had been eliminated for logical 
reasons (see Choosing a Production Function in this chapter ). At this point that 
decision will be reconsidered. The resulting curve for the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution, which has a very good fit (R squared 99%) is very flat.  While clearly 
for these processes Capital and Labor are complements, and one could not produce 
output without both of the factor inputs, in the short-term, it is possible they can act 
as pure substitutes. For example if a line has a bottleneck or a breakdown, in the 
short-term the problem can often be solved with either capital or labor fixes.  
Because of this short-term effect, the Additive Functional form will be included in 
the study, and to be consistent with the other results the form will be expressed 
with natural logs. 
Base form   Volume =  B0 + B1*Capital + B2*Labor 
Log form    ln(volume) = ln(B0 + B1*Capital + B2*Labor) 
The resulting fit ln(volume) = ln(-2.896 + .67*Capital + .02*Labor) 
or in standard form   volume = -2.896 + .67*Capital + .02*Labor 
 The adjusted R squared is very high:  99% 
 The t statistics are significant for all coefficients - above 1% level. 
 The additive form is very restrictive, being a flat plane it has both constant 
returns to scale and infinite elasticity of substitution. 







Table 3.12 Additive Estimates 
 Coefficient  t Statistic 
Constant -2.896 6.47 
Capital .669 25.36 
Labor .020 4.3 
 
 
3.3.2.5 A Comparison of the Four Models 
 All four models provide good fits and a reasonable estimation of the 
coefficients as determined by errors and t statistics and logic (size and signs of 
coefficients).  The only troubling element is the increasing returns to scale found in 
the Constant Elasticity model. 
 As previously identified the key way to judge the goodness of fit is to 
measure the size of the residual errors resulting from the estimations.  The two 
most common methods are to use the root mean square error and the mean  
absolute percent error.  These comparisons are shown in Table 3.13. 
Under both of these measures the Constant Elasticity Function shows a better 
empirical fit.  However, the other three production functional forms still provide 
very good fits and should not be summarily dismissed. 
 
Table 3.13  A Comparison of the Goodness of Fit 
METHOD Cobb-Douglas Constant 
Elasticity 
Trans Log Additive 
RMSE .284 .020 .313 .033 







 However there are several concerns that should be noted, first the Cobb-
Douglas, Constant Elasticity and Additive functional forms include some restrictive 
assumptions which force a certain shape.  Also the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution has increasing returns to scale which are unreasonable, and the shape 
is very flat.    The Translog function presents a concern by not approaching constant 
returns to scale which should be expected across a mature stable production 
process, and under certain conditions results in a negative marginal product of 
labor.  A further comparison of the three models can be found in the statistics listed 
in Table 3.14. 
 Using a midpoint of the data range (50 for capital and 150 for labor) the 
functions would estimate the following output shown in Table 3.15.  These are 
incredibly consistent results and are reflective of the extremely good fits across the 
various estimated functional forms.   
 
Table 3.14  Comparison Statistics 
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Trans Log Additive 
Volume Output 34 34 35 34 
 
 
 While one might argue that one of the forms is superior to the other based on 
either the consistency with engineering design of the lines, or the goodness of fit, it 
is clear that they all represent very good fits with the data as is shown in Table 3.16.  
There is no need to eliminate forms at this time.  The purpose of the empirical fitting 
is to ensure that we have reasonable forms on which to test the impact of wage 
premiums.  We can use all these forms to test the efficiency wage hypothesis and if 
we get consistent results in all circumstances it will serve to strengthen the findings.   
A graphical representation of each of the fitted production functions is shown in 
Figures 3.8-3.11.  These shapes show  a generally flat area for the middle portion of 
the curve where most of the data exists, but show significant differences around the 
edges of the curves. 
  
3.3 Calculating the Wage Premium 
 The wage premium is calculated as a percentage of pay for Mars associates 
over the average pay for similar jobs in the local market.  Mars associate pay is 
described in a previous section of this chapter and is a per hour wage average for all  
 
Table 3.16 Comparison of R squared and MAPE 
 
METHOD Cobb-Douglas Constant 
Elasticity 
Trans Log Additive 
R squared 90% 99% 92% 99% 





nonexempt associates.  This will include the appropriate mix of technicians, high 
level operators and lower level servicers employed.  The market pay to compare this 
with is obtained from the U.S. Government Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).   
 The BLS has been calculating statistics related to pay and employment for 
over 60 years and is the recognized source of market level data.  They provide many 
statistics but the reports of interest to this research are the hourly pay by job within 
a market.  The hourly pay by certain markets has been captured by the BLS since 
before 1970.  The data needed for the 1990s are nothing new to the BLS as it is a 
continuation of surveys that have been completed for many years.  In 1991 and 
1992 the BLS prepared what they call Area Wage Surveys.  These were completed 
every year3 for 120 markets (geographies) and show, by job classifications the 
hours worked, number of employees and average and medium pay. 
In 1992 the name of this report was changed to the Occupational Wage 
Survey but it kept the same geographies and job classifications.  The data were 
compiled by the BLS through surveying establishments with over 50 employees and 
reaching a sample size (in all cases included in this research) of over 50% of the 
market.  The data were then projected by the BLS to represent all establishments in 
the area.  In 1997 the BLS again changed their survey to the National Compensation 
Survey.  Over the next few years they adjusted some of the market areas to better 
represent changes in population patterns.  They also changed the classification of 
jobs or occupations at this time.    
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Figure 3.9 Resulting Constant Elasticity of Substitution 











































 The data collected were from the following sources identified in the 
reference section.   
1. Area Wage surveys- BYU Lee Library Government Documents  
2. Occupational Compensation Surveys- BYU Lee Library Government 
 Documents 
3. Occupational Compensation Surveys- Utah Marriott Library Government 
 Documents 
4.  Metro Area Cross Industry- BLS Web Site Archived Documents 
The BLS data do present some problems.  First geographies can change.  For 
markets used in this research two geographies change. The data for the 1993 and 
1994 survey for Waco include nearby Killeen Texas but in 2000 and 2001 Waco is 
surveyed separately.  The other change is within Chicago.  The borders of the 
Chicago metro area are large and hard to define. During some of the years different 
suburbs are included in the definition of the Chicago metro area.  Neither of these 
market issues is considered significant for the pay data used in this study.  
The other data problem is that surveys are sometimes conducted every other 
year.  For certain key years data will be missing for some statistics.  This can be 
solved by simply averaging the data from the year before and the year after.  While 
not precisely accurate it will give a reasonable measure as pay changes moderately 
over time. 
Another data challenge is errors in the survey.  At times we see very 
unreasonable jumps in the wages for a given year and then they decline to previous 





one year they might include a worker as a fork lift driver and the next year as a 
warehouse specialist even though the worker’s job did not change.  This along with 
the sample selection and participation rate of establishments included in the survey 
can cause an occasional obvious error.  When errors are obvious,  a similar job 
classification that appears more stable during the period in which the error 
occurred will be used to stabilize the numbers. 
 A final related problem is the fact that job classifications changed in 1997.  
The classifications used after 1996 are much more specific and detailed and do not 
necessarily match up with jobs pre-1997.  This is addressed by looking at the 
market for which the most detail exists (Chicago) and bridging jobs between 1996 
and 1997 the year of the change. This bridge, shown in Table 3.17, shows a  
reasonable transition between job classifications and provides encouragement that 
the jobs groupings used before 1996 and after 1997 are consistent.   
The wage is weighted overall by the number of Mars employees in the high, 
medium and low job categories. The weighted average pay between these years 
increased by 2.1%, providing a reasonable bridge between the job classifications.   
 
Table 3.17  Job Classification Bridge for Chicago 
 JOB Pre 1996 WAGE 1996 JOB after 1997 WAGE 1997 
High Maintenance 
Mechanic 





11.18 Machine Operator 11.58 
Low Shipping and 
receiving 
10.15 Handlers/Labor 10.64 





 Specific market occupations need to be selected and weighted together to 
provide an appropriate match for the Mars average wage.   This is done by grouping 
jobs into high pay, medium pay and low pay groupings.  This roughly corresponds to 
the pay zones that Mars operates within.  The highest pay zone is for hourly 
technical associates, which include electrical technicians, and machinery 
maintenance mechanics. Also in this category would be team leaders and quality 
technicians.  The middle pay group would be the experienced machine operators 
and the lower group would be newer associates who have not yet learned key firm 
specific skills.  The low group is used for hand packaging, material movement and 
general labor.  For the early years of the study the BLS job classification had a  
limited number of job classifications with actual data presented.  These included 
several maintenance jobs, and warehousing and material movement jobs.  No 
production job categories were included in the earlier job classifications.   The 
criteria used to pick BLS occupations to match to the Mars jobs were: 1)the 
occupation was consistently available across most of the required years, 2) the 
occupation was consistently available across the geographic markets 3) the data 
included a large number of survey participants so that Mars data could not drive the 
numbers, and 4) the occupation was viewed as reasonable market match with the 
Mars jobs by the researcher.   For the later years of the study the jobs were picked 
with the same four criteria and then matched through the 1996-1997 bridge using 







Table 3.18  BLS Occupations Used 
 Pre-1997 Post-1996 
HIGH PAY Maintenance Mechanic Heavy equipment 
Mechanic 
MEDIUM PAY Warehouse Specialist Machine Operator 
LOWER PAY Shipping and receiving Handlers/Labor 
 
 
An average wage comparison was obtained by creating a percentage weight 
for the Mars job categories by location and then using these percentages to weight 
the BLS wages.  These weights are shown in Table 3.19. 
 With these percentage weights the BLS data can be weighted into an average 
to compare with the Mars average wages.  A wage premium can then be calculated 
as a percentage increase over the market base.  Table 3.20 shows the market wage 
from the BLS calculations and the average Mars wage.  This comparison results in 
the following wage premiums shown in Table 3.21 and graphically in Figure 3.12.   
 






1993 2000 1993 2000
Technician 17% 21% Technician 20% 20%
Operator 53% 51% Operator 42% 43%
Servicer 30% 28% Servicer 38% 37%
WACO ALBANY
1993 2000 1993 2000
Technician 23% 22% Technician 16% 19%
Operator 49% 45% Operator 49% 42%





Table 3.20  BLS and Mars Wages 
 
 










These tables graphically straight-line estimates between 1994 and 2000. 
 The calculated wage premiums show a premium level starting at a range of 
16% to 39% and increasing to a range of 41% to 53%.  Two considerations, which 
partially offset each other, should be considered relative to the size of these 
premiums. The first is the fact that neither the BLS nor Mars payroll data includes 
benefits.  Mars had an extremely rich benefit package during this period with fully 
Albany Chattanooga Chicago Waco Albany Chattanooga Chicago Waco
1993 10.25$           10.04$           12.96$        9.82$             14.22$           13.24$           15.06$           13.22$           
1994 10.10$           10.23$           13.60$        10.17$           15.21$           14.25$           16.21$           13.56$           
2000 11.41$           11.21$           14.38$        10.67$           18.29$           16.80$           20.76$           15.87$           
2001 12.00$           11.56$           15.11$        11.39$           18.39$           17.46$           20.77$           15.62$           
2002 11.78$           11.65$           14.63$        10.97$               
BLS Mars
Albany Chattanooga Chicago Waco
1993 38.8% 31.9% 16.2% 34.7%
1994 50.7% 39.2% 19.3% 33.3%
1995 52.2% 40.9% 23.1% 35.8%
1996 53.8% 42.7% 27.1% 38.3%
1997 55.4% 44.4% 31.2% 40.8%
1998 57.0% 46.2% 35.4% 43.4%
1999 58.6% 48.0% 39.8% 46.0%
2000 60.3% 49.9% 44.3% 48.7%
2001 53.3% 51.0% 37.4% 37.1%



















Figure 3.12 Premium Pay 
 
paid insurance and a top defined benefit pension plan.  This would tend to increase 
the possible premiums.  The second consideration is the tenure of the Mars 
employees.  Because Mars turnover was very low and pay was indirectly tied to 
length of service (see 3.2.2 Payroll Data) Mars employees would have an above 
market average length of service and as a result enjoy a premium wage versus the 
market based on tenure only.   These two partially offsetting considerations are 
expected to remain constant throughout the length of this study and therefore have 







3.4 Testing the Wage Premiums 
 All four production models can be run with wage premiums included.  The 
models will then be assessed in two ways.  The first is for overall enhancement: 
Does the model including wage premiums have better accuracy and fit? The second 
is for individual assessment of the wage premium itself: Does the coefficient of the 
premium make logical sense and is it statistically significant?  These two 
assessments will allow us to conclude that wage premiums do or do not help us 
explain production output. 
 Because wage data were only obtained for 4 years the original models which 
were run on all 10 years of data do not provide a valid bench mark to measure the 
impact of the wage premium.  It is entirely likely that eliminating the 6 years of data 
will have a significant impact thereby confusing the effect of including the wage 
premium. To properly measure the impact of the wage premium an identical base 
model is required so the only difference will be the inclusion of the wage premium.  
The four accepted models from the first fitting will need to be rerun with only the 4 
years of data which include wage data. This will significantly reduce the number of 
observations.4  However there will still be 80 observations for each of the tests, 
enough to reasonably calculate comparisons. 
 The same model structure determined most appropriate from the full 10 
year fitting will be incorporated into the new base models. All models will be run in 
logarithmic format and fixed effects will utilized 
                                                 
4
  An additional  model maintaining the full 10 years of  production data with straight lined estimates for 





 The descriptive statistics for the data which will be used in this regression 
test are shown in Table 3.22.  These are slightly different from the statistics shown 
in Table 3.7 because they only include the 4 years 1993, 1994, 2000 and 2001. 
However the means are similar and while standard deviation increases the 
measures for Kurtosis and Skewness are still roughly within two standard 
deviations and as a result are accepted as normal. 
 
3.4.1 Cobb-Douglas Test 
 The base model covering the 4 years of data has an R squared of 89% and an 
overall F test of 20.66.  The calculated coefficients and significance are shown in 
Table 3.23. 
 The model run with three factor inputs including is structured as : 
Ln (Volume) = Ln(technology) + αLn(Capital)+βLn(Labor)+µLn(Wage Premium) + ε 
or in traditional form  Output =  Volume = tKαLβPµ ε 
 
Table 3.22 Descriptive Statistics For 4 Years with Wage Premiums 
  VOLUME SOC HEADCOUNT PREMIUM 
Mean 27.1 38.5 117.7 1.39 
Standard Error 2.0 3.0 6.7 0.01 
Median 28.1 32.1 128.0 1.39 
Mode 3.4 14.0 142.0 1.50 
Standard Deviation 18.3 27.0 60.0 0.12 
Kurtosis -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.55 
Skewness 0.5 0.8 0.0 -0.39 
Range 72.8 99.4 241.0 0.44 
Minimum 0.7 2.9 8.0 1.16 
Maximum 73.5 102.3 249.0 1.60 






Table 3.23 Cobb-Douglas 4-Year Base 
 Coefficient t statistic 
Capital .78 4.05 
Labor .52 5.26 
 
 
The Cobb-Douglas model  has the following results: 
The model including wage premium  has an R squared of 91% and an overall F test 
of 14.24.   The calculated coefficients and significance are shown in Table 3.24: 
 From an overall perspective the model is not improved.  The reduction in the  
 overall F test shows that there is a slightly higher chance that the model is not 
significant.  However from the individual assessment of the premium we learn that 
most.  The negative coefficient is counter intuitive. It implies that as wage premium  
increases then output declines.  The coefficient is also not significantly different 
from zero.  From the Cobb-Douglas comparison we cannot conclude that wage 
premiums significantly influence output levels as the efficiency wage theory 
proposes.  
 
Table 3.24  Cobb-Douglas 4-Year Wage Test 
 
 Coefficient  t  statistic 
Capital .916 4.02 
Labor .491 4.69 









3.4.2 Additive Model Test 
 The additive model assumes that factor inputs are perfect substitutes.  In the 
efficiency wage model which we are testing wage premiums are not a substitute for 
labor. Instead they enhance the labor and encourage additional effort.  Rather than 
adding on wage premiums as a separate independent variable, labor will be 
multiplied by the wage premium percent. This will show a labor amplified by wage  
premiums as the substitute for capital. This technique for showing the efficiency of 
labor is an accepted approach (Mankiw, 2009).  The additive model augmented to 
include wage premiums is as follows: 
Ln(Volume) = Ln(Constant + αCapital + β(Labor*Wage Premium))5 
The revised base for the additive model run on the 4 years of data for which we have 
wage premiums results in: 
An adjusted R squared of 99.02% and a residual deviation of 31.94.  The resulting 
coefficients are shown in Table 3.25: 
 After including the premium wages the model results in: An adjusted R squared of 
98.99% and a residual deviation of 34.84.  The resulting coefficients are shown in 
Table 3.26: 
 
Table 3.25 Additive 4-Year Base 
 Coefficient t  Statistic 
Constant 3.185 3.62 
Capital .661 12.96 
Labor .0248 2.8 
 
                                                 
5
 Some readers have suggested that wage premium be  added  as an input to production, substitutable with 
labor and capital.  This format has been run as an additional test and yields a negative (counter intuitive) 





Table 3.26  Additive 4-Year Wage Test 
 
 Coefficient  t Statistic 
Constant 3.175 3.36 
Capital .678 12.83 
Labor .013 2.21 
 
 
 From an overall perspective the model is not improved, with slight negative 
adjustments to the residual deviation and the adjusted R-squared. And while there 
is no specific coefficient for premium wage the coefficient for headcount (which now 
includes premium wage impact) is smaller and less significant. 
Using the Additive model comparison we cannot conclude that wage premiums 
significantly influence output levels as the efficiency wage theory proposes. 
 
3.4.3 Translog Test 
 The translog model is a more complicated model with squared terms and 
cross products. To include wage premiums will require a three-factor model which 
is expressed as follows: 
Ln(Volume) = Constant + B1Ln(Capital)+B2Ln(Labor)+ B3 Ln(Wage Premium) +B4Ln2 
(Capital)  + B5Ln2(Labor) + B6Ln2(Wage Premium)+ B7Ln(Capita)×Ln(Labor) 
+B8Ln(Capita)×Ln(Wage Premium)+B9Ln(Labor)×Ln(Wage Premium) 
The base model, run as before but with only the 4 years of data results in the 
following: 
An overall adjusted R squared of 89.69% and an overall F Test of 10.91.  The 
resulting coefficients are shown in Table 3.27. 





Table 3.27 Translog 4-Year Base 
 Coefficient t Statistic 
Log Labor -.759 -1.58 
Log Capital .239 .22 
Log Labor squared .220 2.05 
Log Capital squared .204 1.31 
Cross product -.168 .89 
Constant 1.05 .57 
 
 
An overall adjusted R squared of 86.91% and an overall F Test of 3.27.  The resulting 
coefficients are as shown in Table 3.28. 
 From an overall perspective the model is not improved, with slight negative 
adjustments to the  R squared and the overall F Test. And while there is no single 
coefficient for premium wage, the coefficients are all now statistically insignificant.  
An F test on the four coefficients which contain wage premium gives  F (4,48) = .64 
with a probability of .637.  As a result we conclude that there is no statistical 
significance to including the wage premium into the equation. 
 
Table 3.28 Translog 4-Year Wage Test 
 
 Coefficient t Statistic 
Log Labor -.604 -1.13 
Log Wage premium 1.223   1.03 
Log Capital -.166   -.06 
Log Labor squared .194   1.74 
Log Wage premium 
squared 
.409   1.47 
Log Capital squared .237     .73 
Capital X Labor -.166    -.84 
Capital X Wage Premium -.0028    -.01 
Labor X Wage Premium -.04    -.21 






 Using the Translog model comparison we cannot conclude that wage 
premiums significantly influence output levels as the efficiency wage theory 
proposes. 
 
3.4.4 Constant Elasticity of  Substitution Test 
 The Constant Elasticity model also requires a slightly different form with 
three factor inputs.  The model including wage premium is expressed as follows: 
  ln volume  ln      
  
   
 ln                                 
The base model, formatted as previously derived, but with only the 4 years of data 
results in the following: 
An adjusted R squared of 99.40% and a residual deviation of -7.6229.  The 
calculated coefficients and statistical significance are shown in Table 3.29. 
After including the premium wages the model results in: 
An adjusted R squared of 99.39% and a residual deviation of -7.62844.  The 
calculated coefficients and statistical significance are shown in Table 3.30.  
 The models are almost identical. The very minor changes in R squared and 
residual deviation imply a model moving in the wrong direction. The coefficients do 
not show much change but the significance of the constant and weight for capital 
take a steep drop. The significance of the scale and Rho show only the smallest 
 
Table 3.29  CES 4-Year Base 
 Coefficient  t Statistic 
Constant -1.98 10.74 
Scale 1.34 2.62 
Weight to capital 88% 16.33 





Table 3.30  CES 4-Year Wage Test 
 
 Coefficient  t Statistic 
Constant -1.8 .765 
Scale 1.34 2.59 
Weight to capital 76% .53 
Weight to headcount 10% 2.63 
Rho .928 2.63 
 
 
incremental drop, but again imply a model moving in the wrong direction. 
 Using the CES model comparison we cannot conclude that wage premiums 
significantly influence output levels as the efficiency wage theory proposes. 
 
3.4.5 Test Conclusion 
 It is inopportune that payroll data were limited resulting in the number of 
observations being necessarily dropped when conducting this final test of payroll 
impact.  However, given the consistent results across all four tests we are forced to 
rely as much on the preponderance of evidence as on the depth of a more satisfying 
individual test.  The conclusion of the tests is that this specific data sample does not 
provide any support for the idea that premium wages increase effort which 
increases output.   Table 3.31 summarizes the statistics for the overall fit.  
  Given the reduced number of payroll observations versus production 
information an alternative test has been prepared.  The entire test above has been 
repeated using the full 10 years of production data and using wage premiums with 
the missing data filled in as a straight line between the 1993/1994 and 2000/2001 



















Adjusted R Squared 0.892 0.906
F Test 20.66 14.24
Additive  
Adjusted R Squared 0.9902 0.9899
Residual Dev. 31.94 34.84
Translog  
Adjusted R Squared 0.8969 0.8691
F Test 10.91 3.27
CES
Adjusted R Squared 0.994 0.9939
Residual Dev -7.6229 -7.62844
Albany Chattanooga Chicago Waco Albany Chattanooga Chicago Waco
1993 10.25$           10.04$           12.96$        9.82$             14.22$           13.24$           15.06$           13.22$           
1994 10.10$           10.23$           13.60$        10.17$           15.21$           14.25$           16.21$           13.56$           
1995 10.30$           10.39$           13.72$        10.25$           15.69$           14.64$           16.90$           13.92$           
1996 10.52$           10.55$           13.85$        10.34$           16.18$           15.05$           17.61$           14.29$           
1997 10.73$           10.71$           13.99$        10.42$           16.68$           15.47$           18.35$           14.67$           
1998 10.96$           10.87$           14.12$        10.50$           17.20$           15.90$           19.12$           15.06$           
1999 11.18$           11.04$           14.25$        10.59$           17.74$           16.34$           19.92$           15.46$           
2000 11.41$           11.21$           14.38$        10.67$           18.29$           16.80$           20.76$           15.87$           
2001 12.00$           11.56$           15.11$        11.39$           18.39$           17.46$           20.77$           15.62$           






Appendix C and importantly confirms the results of the original test presented here. 
In Table 3.32  years 1993, 1994 2000, 2001 and 2002 are actual data points and 
other years are straight line interpolations between the actual data points.  In this 
alternative test the original production models can serve as the comparison base. 
 
3.4.6 Possible Reasons for These Results 
 Given the popular support for the efficiency wage argument and the bulk of 
articles and test supporting the hypothesis it is a small surprise that we find 
absolutely no evidence of wage premiums' impact on output.  While this research 
cannot determine the exact reasons why, ideas about the reasons for a lack of 
significance should be proposed.  
 One must first consider that, at least in this case, the efficiency wage 
hypothesis is simply not valid.  This is a specific case study for one company and  
four manufacturing locations. The efficiency wage hypothesis could be reality in 
many situations but not be a universal maxim, thus allowing for differences in 
specific situations such as the one in this research.  The results of this study apply 
specifically to the particular data and do not extend to other firms . A corollary of 
this point is that this case study may be an exceptional situation.  And indeed this 
firm has many institutionally established cultures that could overpower other 
influences.  The specific cultural institutions of this firm are addressed in Chapter 4. 
 Second, limited data or errors in the data may prevent a true result. Given 
that the data were sourced directly from payroll and operational reporting systems 
we believe that the data are as robust as business performance data can be and are 





referenced studies of efficiency wage (see Chapter 2).  The limited data extends 
across four plants each with multiple production lines over 10 years. The specific 
limits to the data are fully incorporated in the degrees of freedom used in the 
statistical tests of significance.  The type I error that a population characteristic 
which actually exists will not be found is small (for every test less than 5%). 
 Even if the efficiency wage hypothesis is valid, over time, in a team 
production environment the impact may diminish.  This may explain why no wage 
premium impact on output was detected in this study. Efficiency wage may have 
diminishing effects over time and eventually be replaced with a sense of 
entitlement.   When an employee first starts she accepts the job understanding a 
wage premium in comparison to her alternative options.  The wage premium can 
attract, motivate and retain per the efficiency wage hypothesis.  In a team 
environment production output per associate is not visible.  However, each manager 
and employee will form a subjective opinion of each team member's contribution. 
After many years of working side by side with other employees who make the same 
wage, she will notice that some put forth less effort and are rewarded the same.  As a 
result she will feel entitled to the wage given that she feels she puts forth an average 
effort.  At the locations in the case study there are many long time employees and 
this would be an interesting employee attitude to test for and understand.  This of 
course could be compensated for if reward, including wage, were differentiated and 
awarded by effort.  In our case study wages of all team members are the same and 









4. TESTING INSTITUTIONALISM AND 
 
 POWER RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
4.1 Mars Culture 
 
 Mars, Incorporated is known for its unique, strong and pervasive culture.  
From the early days during the great depression until now many of the values and 
principles of the company have remained unchanged and uniquely Mars.   Most 
family businesses do not last beyond the second generation, as divided ownership 
and interest lead to public sale.  Mars, Incorporated is now on its fourth generation 
ownership.  This is a testimony to the strong and pervasive culture developed 
within Mars.  This also accounts for the strong institutions that have developed 
within the culture.   These rules of the game, which provide constraints and 
structure to the employment relationship, all favor premium pay for employees. 
 The first element of this unique culture comes from being run by family 
owners.  "As a family business we base our activities on family values." (Mars, 
Incorporated, 2005, p. 19).  The family owners worked tirelessly side by side with 
their employees.  The owners traveled extensively to all sites around the world, 
showing up at 6:00am ready for work.  The family has always been very concerned 
about privacy, shunning personal publicity and did not even allow portraits of the 





maximizing rule would not always hold.  As an example, one of the family members 
had responsibility for a factory that burned down when he was young.  As a result, 
he insisted on over-the-top fire protection at all sites.  One engineering contractor 
was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement and said, " I'm happy to sign it but 
why do you care - no one else would build like this!"  
 A second element of the unique culture was an egalitarian and paternalistic 
approach.  From the beginning there were no private offices, no private parking 
spaces, only a few broad jobs.  Employees were called "associates" and everyone 
from the president on down was required to clock into a time clock each morning. 
Because the owners worked side by side with associates throughout the world their 
personal exacting standards became a third element of the culture.  In terms of 
stated company values this was referred to as "Quality - the consumer is our boss, 
quality is our work and value for money is our goal" (Mars, Incorporated, 1983, p. 
1).  However, the exacting standards were more than a product quality expectation.  
They included personal commitment .  One company lawyer ended up being called 
in to work on the day of her wedding and she came. 
 Finally one of the owners (an engineer) had a love of engineering technology.  
He believed that the only sustainable competitive advantage was a technical one.  He 
insisted on highly mechanized plants and the latest and best technology.  This 
cultural tenet became important in labor policy as higher skilled workers who were 
willing to learn and progress with technology were required. 





 The first is increased termination costs.  Because of the intense private 
nature of the owners a threat of publicity was associated with termination. This 
threat increases the implicit cost of firing a worker or even the voluntary departure 
of an unhappy associate.  Any adverse legal action was avoided at all possible costs. 
 Second, this firm had a need for employment longevity.  Because the owners  
worked side by side with associates they required a personal trust to be built up 
over time.  They would prefer to work with someone they knew and trusted rather 
than the latest business savant from outside.  As such they needed to encourage 
employment stability. 
 Third is a difficult work environment. Because the owners were known to be 
demanding and because there were no private offices, associates were expected to 
endure difficult public treatment.  If a company wants to be able to berate associates 
publicly, and change personal decisions and directives at a whim, a company must 
compensate the employees to offset these negatives associated with the job. 
 Fourth is the threat of unions.  Because the company was a private family 
owned company the threat of unions was not a simple business issue.  The threat of 
unions was taken as a threat to the family ownership and control of the company.   
 These rules of the game, which provide constraints and structure to the 
employee relationship, all favor payment of premium pay to employees in order to 









4.2.1 Why Use a Survey 
 
 While performance data were obtained for the efficiency wage test they do 
not exist to address the other wage theories.   This is because the culture, 
institutions and management policy and practice were the same at all locations and 
all lines.  As a result a management survey will be used to test support of each 
theory in practice.  A survey of those who set and managed wage policy is 
appropriate given that institutional structures, power relationships and agency 
theory go directly to the forces that motivated pay setting practices.  Many of these 
questions imply motivational, cultural issues and even fear as a compelling factor.   
A survey asking directly about these issues can identify their existence and impact. 
The wage theories that will be addressed by this management survey include 
agency theory, strength of institutional factors and power relationships.  In addition, 
for the purpose of consistency and support, questions will also address the 
efficiency wage theory which has been empirically tested in Chapter 3.  
 The plant management and corporate analyst at the firm who had control 
over wage policy spent considerable time studying wage issues, conducting 
competitive surveys, and interviewing employees and managers.   They would 
gather whatever information was available to them on employee retention, 
motivation, satisfaction and engagement.  This would be used in formulating wage 
policy and evaluating its success.  Wage proposals were made by the individual 
plants based on their needs and environment and approved by the corporate office.  





management team after discussions with the plant manager and the plant 
management team.  
 
4.2.2 Institutional Review Board 
 Because of the standards surrounding contact with human subjects, this 
survey and research was reviewed by the University of Utah Institutional Review 
Board.  On June 24, 2010 the IRB ruled that this request 00042056 was exempt 
under 45 CFR 46.101(b), Categories 2 and 4, from the Federal regulations governing 
human research.  However, it is the policy of the University of Utah that all human 
subject research which is exempt under this section will nevertheless be conducted 
in accordance with the Belmont report.  
 
4.2.3 Survey Design 
 The survey is designed as a cross-sectional survey with ordered categories.   
A question directed at each economic wage theory is asked about management 
intent and again the same question is asked about applied effectiveness.   The 10 
recommendations of Busha and Harter (1980) regarding question structure have 
been incorporated into the survey design.  Designing good questions can be more 
difficult than it seems. In addition to incorporating Busha and Harter's 10 
recommendations the questions were prereviewed orally with a three-member 
focus group selected from the sample to make sure they were clear and understood.  







Table 4.1  Survey Questions and Economic Wage Theory 
SURVEY QUESTION ECONOMIC WAGE THEORY 
ADDRESSED 
Were the following significant forces in 
pay setting policy:   
 
1     Avoiding Unions Power Relationships 
2     Obtaining Loyalty and 
commitment 
Institutional Structures 
3     Hiring the best employees Institutional Structures 
4     Sharing the prosperity with 
employees -Fairness  
Institutional Structures 
5     Preventing turnover Efficiency Wage 
6     Obtaining extra motivation and 
effort 
Efficiency Wage 




Was premium pay effective in achieving 
the following: 
 
8     Avoiding Unions Power Relationships 
9     Obtaining Loyalty and 
commitment 
Institutional Structures 
10   Hiring above average employees Institutional Structures 
11   Sharing the prosperity with 
employees -Fairness  
Institutional Structures 
12    Preventing turnover Efficiency Wage 
13    Obtaining extra motivation and 
effort 
Efficiency Wage 




During the 1990s did Management 
philosophy regarding pay change 
 
15   Premium pay was seen as 
successful and increased 
Overall Evaluation of Premium Pay per 
Efficiency Wage 
16   Premium pay was seen as 
unnecessary and decreased 









 Answers to these questions are recorded within an ordered category.  The 
answers are coded in number form with 1 being “NO” and 5 being “YES.”  Clearly the 
labels are not numbers and there is no clear assertion that numerically the 
categories are as purely arithmetic as say a temperature scale.  However, the 5 
ordered categories are presented to the survey participants as a scale with verbal 
descriptions only provided at the opposites ends of the scale. These form a rational 
sequence and allow some limited quantitative analysis.  We can calculate averages 
and distributions to represent survey response.   
 
4.2.4 Addressing Inherent Survey Errors 
 Surveys must be designed to avoid specific errors such as sampling selection 
error, noncoverage error, nonresponse error and measurement errors. 
 Since the population is quite small and an attempt is made to survey the 
entire population the sample selection error is not significant.  In general increasing 
the sample size decreases the sampling error (Cui, 2003).  In our case the attempted 
sample size is 100% minimizing the risk of sample selection error. 
 There is an issue with noncoverage error.  Some of the retired management 
members cannot be located to include in the survey sample.  However, there is no 
reason to think that the members of the population who can no longer be located 
have different characteristics from those who have been located.  They do not 
represent a specific class or strata of the population but instead are assumed to be a 
random part of the population. 
 The nonresponse error is small.  Response rates were managed by using the 





system used to improve response rates.   Using this approach perceived 
participation costs were minimized using short easy questions and explaining the 
limited commitment upfront.  Perceived rewards were maximized by briefly 
explaining the possible research benefits.  And trust was enhanced by using the 
name of the University of Utah (Dillman, 1991). 
 Measurement errors are mistakes made by those taking the survey.  Because 
of the very simple nature of this survey the possibility of measurement errors has 
been minimized.  Also the results appear to be consistent both within and across 
survey participants. 
 Sometimes researchers find it necessary to stratify the sample and weight 
the elements of the sample.  Most advanced survey techniques use approaches like 
this to normalize or adjust sample weights to the assumed population weights.  
These techniques are not necessary in this research.  The only possible way to 
stratify the sample is by the job that the member of the plant management team 
held, and this is not necessary.  While some members of the team may have had 
more influence on the pay policy (Plant Manager, Human Resource Manager) all 
members of the team participated fully in the discussion and had equal information.  
As a result they should have similar views on the team’s motives and policy 









4.2.5 Sample Size Selection 
 The sample size is a primary factor in understanding the statistical 
significance of the survey results.  Generally surveys try to minimize both errors,  
alpha (finding a difference that does not actually exist in the population) and beta 
(failing to find a difference that actually exists in the population) (Peers, 1996).  In 
this research a key impact on sample size is the small size of the population.  It is 
estimated that the population is approximately  40 (N=40).  The plant management 
team is composed of approximately  five individuals (plant director, operations 
manager, human resource manager, finance manager and commercial manager).  If 
during the 10-year study each plant had two individuals in each position the four 
locations would provide a population of about 40.    Because many of these 
individuals have retired and left the business, only 20 of them can still be located.  
This limits the sample size due to practical considerations rather than statistical 
choice.   Actual response rates provide only 15 survey results from this sample.  A 
sample of 15 out of a population of 40 is a 38% coverage ratio.   While this would be 
extremely high for most surveys with a population of thousands, given the small 
population it does not provide the full coverage desired for the general margin of 
error of 5%. 
 The actual impact can be calculated using Cochran's sample size formula. 
This formula is particularly useful for this research because it makes adjustments 
for small populations (Cochran, 1977). 
 
   
      






No is the sample size. 
T is the alpha error. 
SV is the variance of the scale variable (usually size of the scale divided by 6 for 6  
standard deviations) 
S is the numerical size of the scale. 
AE is the acceptable margin of error from the mean. 










Using the desired 5% alpha error and the standard 5% error for the mean a desired 
population calculation would be: 
 
   
          
        
                 
  
   
  
   
 
 
 As shown per the Cochran calculation the optimal sample size would be 21.   
Given the fact that data points have been obtained for only 15 from the estimated 
population of 40  the error assumption will be higher than the desired 5%.   Using 
the formula with a sample size of 15 will result in an alpha error of 13%.   This is 
substantially higher than the 5% desired a priori but is still workable for inferences 






4.2.6 Survey Results 
 
 Table 4.2 provides a summary of survey results.  While the averages of many 
questions were similar there are some unambiguous outliers.  Also, by using the 
confidence interval the questions can all be clearly positioned as either close to yes 
or no. 
 The questions about the wage theory of power relationships (1,8) clearly tell 
us that management was conscious of this issue and felt that premium pay was very  
 




QUESTION Average Std Error High Low
Were the following significant forces in pay setting policy:
1         Avoiding Unions 4.27 0.228 4.75 3.78
2         Obtaining Loyalty and commitment 4.57 0.173 4.94 4.20
3         Hiring the best employees 4.67 0.159 5.01 4.33
4         Sharing the prosperity with employees -Fairness 3.60 0.289 4.22 2.98
5         Preventing turnover 3.60 0.235 4.10 3.10
6        Obtaining extra motivation and effort 3.33 0.270 3.91 2.76
7        Making life easier for management and personnel 2.07 0.300 2.71 1.43
Was premium pay effective in achieving the following:
8         Avoiding Unions 4.67 0.159 5.01 4.33
9         Obtaining Loyalty and commitment 3.85 0.274 4.43 3.26
10        Hiring above average employees 4.07 0.228 4.55 3.58
11        Sharing the prosperity with employees -Fairness 3.43 0.327 4.12 2.73
12       Preventing turnover 4.20 0.279 4.80 3.60
13         Obtaining extra motivation and effort 2.53 0.256 3.08 1.99
14        Making life easier for management and personnel 2.20 0.279 2.80 1.60
  
During the 1990s did Management philosophy regarding pay change
15       Premium pay was seen as successful and increased 2.80 0.359 3.56 2.04






effective in the fight to keep unions out.  In fact it was one of only two questions  
with a higher average response in the second set of questions (where management 
felt premium pay was more effective in achieving the goal) than the first set of 
questions (where management rated the goal relative to pay setting policy). 
 The questions about agency theory (7,14) clearly had the lowest scores of all 
questions.  Management did not feel that the nonprofit maximizing goals of 
management impacted pay setting policy.  And in fact many of the ad-hoc comments 
submitted reiterated the fact that even though pay was high, management tasks 
were very difficult because employees continued to express demands and voice 
issues, despite the premium pay. 
 While turnover issues (questions 5, 12) were not number 1 on the list of pay 
setting objectives there was solid evidence that management felt the premium was 
extremely successful in minimizing turnover.  This is a version of the efficiency wage 
hypothesis (see Chapter 2) and holds up to the reasonability test.  If the present 
value of the wage premium is less than the cost of recruiting and training then the 
efficiency wage is rational.  However, because it was rated third to last out of the 
seven objectives considered, any argument for this as the reason for premium pay is 
minimized.  Management clearly felt that the other issues were stronger forces in 
selecting premium wage. 
 Also relative to efficiency wage, management clearly did not feel that 
premium wage actually achieved increased productivity (shirking model), or even 
that it was offered in an attempt to obtain better productivity (questions 6,13).  This 





philosophy seems to have changed over time to reflect a belief that premium pay 
was not worth it (question 16). 
 Management appears to see all the institutional and cultural factors to be 
significant (questions 3,4,5,10,11,12).  Some of the free form comments made also 
support the interpretation of the importance of cultural factors, such as "part of an 
extended family- employment for life - family (owners) wanted long term trusted 
people - changed paternalism to individualism." 
 Figure 4.1 shows the survey results with a confidence interval and Figure 4.2 











Figure 4.2  Survey Result Percentiles 
 
 
            Figure 4.1 shows the average and a 95% confidence interval.  Figure 4.2 
shows percentiles.  These charts reinforce the comments listed above. In particular 
the second shows that the bulk of the percentile weights are even more skewed than 
the  
averages, with 11 of the 16 questions having only one tail and 50% of the weights 
being on a maximum end.  Hence the differences between question results are more 









5  MOTIVATIONAL THEORY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP  
 




 Economists have historically focused on the relationship between incentives 
and behavior in order to explain human action.  Wages have been considered the 
incentive identified to motivate work and compensate for the disutility of the task. 
Wages appropriately play a large role in most economic theory related to the 
production process. In the modern era, a significant amount of research analyzing 
motivation (including wage as a factor) has been done by sociologist and 
organizational behavior specialists.  These strains of social science, separate from 
economics, have produced a large body of work, both theoretical and empirical.  The 
motivational research both supports and discredits certain elements of the 
economic theories. In this chapter it will be shown that the relationship between 
wage and motivation which is so important to neoclassical wage theory is seriously 
challenged by both theoretical and empirical work.  In addition much of the 
organizational and motivation research emphasizes the importance of institutional 
factors as a trigger and rationale for motivation which is very closely aligned with 
the institutional wage theories. Most of the contemporary motivational theories 
have a substantial amount of supporting research (Judge, 2009). They also 





understanding and contrasting the motivational research with the economic 
theories, a more holistic and real world view of the human behavior underlying 
wage theory can be achieved. 
 Management behavioral scientists define motivation in a way consistent with 
effort in the efficiency wage theory.  "We define motivation as the processes that 
account for individual's intensity, direction and persistence of effort toward 
attaining a goal" (Mitchell, 1997, p. 61) . With motivation (intensity, direction and 
persistence) an employee will be capable of increasing output (the goal).  This 
definition is reminiscent of the efficiency wage relationship between effort and 
output  Output = F(e(w)).   
 
5.1 Background 
 As a background to understanding motivational theories' relationship to the 
economic theories of wage, two studies will be helpful in building a foundation. The 
first, a framework by Benabou and Triole and the second, an empirical research 
study by Ingalens and Roussel. 
 Benabou and Triole (2003) develop an equation that shows how multiple 
elements work together effecting motivation. The equation relies on three variables,  
β, the specific parameters of the work task and the ability of the employee,  p, the 
policy of management, and e, the effort of the employee.   These three variables can 
determine both the manager's and the employee's payoff.  Payoff is the utility 
achieved by either a manager or employee as a result of their actions. The expected 





     β,      β  σ p   p  β  
 
 Here U is the utility (payoff) to the employer,  and sigma    is the parameter 
of asynchronous information.  Only a portion of the full fixed information β is 
assumed to have been signaled to the employee about the task and the employee's 
abilities.   β  is the employee's interpretation of β given the portion ( ) of 
information signaled and his interpretation of the policy adopted by the manager.  
    is the employee's optimal effort (from his point of view) and depends on the 
policy and his interpretation of the work parameters and his ability.  When 







   
  




   
  
   
   
  
   
  
       
 
                              Terms:    First    Second             Third 
 
 The first term represents the cost to the manager of the policy, for example 
the higher wage.  The second term represents the direct impact of the policy on the 
employee's behavior.  It is within this term that efficiency wage effects could 
materialize as policy (wage and other factors) drives effort.  The third term is about 
employee perception of management motive which could be favorable or 
unfavorable. The employee will interpret the policy based on his or her view of the 
managers' objectives.  Generally the first term is assumed to be negative as the 
manager has to give something to the employee. The second term is assumed to be 





could be of either sign based on the employee’s positive or negative perceptions 
about management motive and as a result swing the overall result positive or 
negative. For example, based on the way it is communicated, an employee may 
interpret an assignment to work overtime as a punishment for being inefficient or as 
a reward for being the most able to contribute. This equation is used to outline 
several conditions.   
 1.  Employee sensitivity to and perception of performance incentives can 
negatively impact perceptions about the task and overwhelm the direct 
motivational impacts  of the policy. 
 2.  Incentives can be weak motivators in the short run and negative in the 
long run and they impact employee perceptions (Benabou & Triole, 2003). 
 3.  Ability β and effort     can serve as complements and someone with 
perceived greater ability could reduce effort in the presences of a pass - fail 
outcome. 
  These conclusions set the stage for the following discussion in this chapter of 
the limited role of wage and the importance of policy and culture beyond wage.  It 
can also apply directly to the Mars data used in this research, given that everyone is 
paid on the same scale so pass -fail are the only likely results of effort.  Since output 
is only measured for the team, this allows the perception of ability (true or not) to 
be a substitute for reduced effort (see condition 3 above). 
 In the second background research Igalens and Roussel (1999) published a 
study on the relationship between pay and work motivation. Their field test and 





collected 566 surveys from employees in France, but more importantly, 297 of these 
surveys were from nonexempt (eligible for overtime) employees which are 
consistent with the 5000 nonexempt Mars, Inc. employees included in this research. 
 Igalens and Roussel tested, using the French worker survey, whether fixed 
pay, flexible pay and benefits were related to motivation and concluded that the 
valence attached to fixed pay, flexible pay and benefits did not influence work 
motivation. The results from Igalens and Roussel are consistent with the results of 
the direct production functions empirically tested in this research (see Chapter 3).  
For the nonexempt associates the relationship of fixed pay to motivation was 
negative and the relationship of variable pay and benefits to motivation was 
insignificant. 
 
5.2 Neoclassical Wage Theory 
 Neoclassical wage theory rests on wage being the driving force behind 
motivation.  It is through wage that the negatives associated with work are 
overcome and justify the tradeoff with leisure. The efficiency wage theory postulates 
that through additional wage extra effort is generated and incremental output is 
achieved.  Both the early content motivational theories and the cognitive theories 
challenge this assumption. 
 Early theories on motivation such as Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 
1954)  and Herzberg's two-factor theory (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959) 
were largely focused on content. Maslow’s well known theory separated needs into 
lower order needs and higher order needs. Herzberg analyzed the factors that 





satisfaction and those that lead to dissatisfaction.  Even though these two theories 
are some of the original motivation theories, the content elements are still included 
within the most contemporary theories. 
 A major point that is relevant from these early motivational theories is that 
wages are a small part of motivation.  Relative to Maslow's hierarchy, wages would 
fit largely in the lowest need state - physiological needs. Herzberg calls this level of 
need hygiene factors and completely separates hygiene factors from what he calls 
motivational factors.  Of the 16 factors that Herzberg identifies as contributing to job 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction salary ends up only being a minor one (Herzberg, 
2003 ).  If pay is a minor factor affecting motivation, links between wage and effort 
as identified by the efficiency wage model become suspect. 
 The factors that Herzberg list as being most important relative to motivation 
include relationship with supervisor, company policy and administration and 
recognition and achievement.  These factors would fit much better with the 
structural arguments supporting the institutional economic theories of wage 
because the institutional theories are based on policy and cultural and social norms.  
Even these earlier motivational theories recognized the role of group dynamics and 
a need to see employees as complex individuals with many motivational influences. 
 
5.2.1 Cognitive Evaluation Theory 
 Cognitive Evaluation Theory proposes that extrinsic rewards, such as pay, 
can actually reduce the intrinsic reward of the work, thereby potentially reducing 
motivation (effort).  While this is somewhat counter intuitive it has been backed up 





Possible reasons have been suggested why this might occur. These reasons include 
the idea that extrinsic rewards give an individual a loss of personal control along 
with the idea that an individual may perceive that if higher extrinsic rewards are 
provided, they must be required; therefore the previous level of intrinsic rewards 
must not be valid and are therefore reduced.   The cognitive theory has major 
implications for management and pay setting policy because of implying that any 
motivational impact of a pay increase might be more than offset by a reduction in 
personal motivating factors. If taken to an extreme the theory could even suggest 
that workers should pay to increase their personal work satisfaction.   
  Relative to the economic wage theories, cognitive theory would of course be 
at odds with neoclassical theory and efficiency wage theory. Perhaps cognitive 
theory would fit better with Marx's view of work alienation and human desires for 
fulfilling work because Marx stresses a natural intrinsic motivation which he sees as 
shattered by the capitalist system (Bertell, 1971). Because of its controversial 
conclusions it is not surprising that this theory has been attacked in both 
methodology and interpretations.  These attacks have raised some substantial 
questions. Today we understand that there are many underlying factors for 
motivation and the framework proposed by Cognitive Evaluation Theory may or 
may not appropriately apply to a situation depending on specific circumstances 
(Judge, 2009).  However it has been observed per the studies referenced previously 
that there are occasions where the introduction of extrinsic rewards such as 






5.3 Institutional Wage Theory 
 Institutional theories on wage rest on historical processes and organizational 
practices. These include among a wide range of additional factors, things like 
bureaucratic hiring rules, social job "contracts," manager moral responsibility, legal 
wage and work laws, and firm specific training and knowledge (see Chapter 2).  
Within this theory wages and effort are not always directly connected. One can find 
many parallels with the wide range of impacting factors that institutional economic 
thought applies to wages and the factors which modern motivational theories apply 
to motivation.   The relationship of modern motivational theories to institutional 
wage theory will be explored through Expectancy Theory which serves as an 
umbrella theory of many current theories on motivation. 
 
5.3.1 Expectancy Theory 
 One of the most widely held explanations of motivation is Victor Vrom's 
expectancy theory published in 1964.  Expectancy theory can be considered an 
umbrella theory because many of the other contemporary theories on motivation fit 
within the three relationships on which expectancy theory is built.  By describing 
this theory the parallels with institutional economic thought can be pointed out.  It 
is also highly supported by the empirical research (Judge, 2009).   
 Expectancy theory proposes that motivation depends on three factors. 
Vroom refers to these three major expectancy theory factors or variables as 
expectancy, instrumentality and valence. (Vroom, 1964).  The three relationship 
variables are multiplicative. If any one of them is zero, total motivation will be zero, 





  The first is the expectation that effort will produce result.  This is supported 
by the theory of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), the internal belief in personal 
capabilities. If an individual does not have the capabilities to perform at a high level, 
no amount of effort will result in high performance.  Rational individuals recognize 
this connection and will put forth effort only where they think it will be effective.  
This expectation also requires a belief that the organization or system can recognize 
the extra performance, that it will be visible. For example, extra effort put into the 
creation of a contingency plan that will likely never be reviewed or used is not likely 
to be recognized by an organization. Relative to institutional wage theory the level 
of visibility of both effort and results is highly reliant upon the institutional 
processes for monitoring and measuring. Firm specific knowledge and culture will 
also influence the expectation that effort will produce a result. 
 The second factor in this theory is the expectation that performance will 
produce a reward. The motivational theory of equity (Adams, 1965) fits into the 
expectancy theory here. Many employees see the performance reward relationship 
as weak. They believe that social skills, length of service or race and ethnicity could 
influence rewards just as much or more than performance. This relates directly to 
the case study in this research. If all members of a team are paid the same wage, as 
was the case at Mars, but are seen to put forth different amounts of effort, team 
members would perceive the situation as unfair. This is not motivating and can 
create anger and guilt.  The strength of the performance reward relationship will 






 The third factor is the expectation that the reward will be personally 
satisfying.  The motivational theory of reinforcement (Komaki, Coombs, & 
Schepman, 1996) fits into this factor. If an employee wants recognition but instead 
gets a pay raise or wants a pay raise but instead gets rewarded with more work, the 
reward will not be satisfying.  It also raises the question, "Do all employees want the 
same thing?"  In economics the simplifying assumption of homogeneity is regularly 
used, and in business. most managers neither have the authority nor practical 
capability to individualize rewards.   The recognition of the importance of rewards 
beyond pay alone further aligns expectancy theory with institutional wage theory 
rather than neoclassical wage theory. 
 
5.4 The Relationship Between Motivational Theory 
and Economic Wage Theories 
 There are a many motivational theories which have been supported with 
empirical research. From this it is clear that motivational theory is not simple. Labor 
does not respond uniformly to a single variable, even one as powerful as wage. 
 Within economics the effort is often made to isolate the impact of individual 
variables with an assumption of ceteris paribus, holding everything else constant.  
But the reality is that there is never a case where "everything else" is held constant. 
The state of flux and the number of variables and interactions involved with 
motivating employees to extend additional effort make such an assumption 
unreasonable.  It is most practical to approach motivation with an umbrella theory 
such as expectancy theory and then relate the underlying principles exposed to the 







Figure 5.1 Relationship Between Motivational and Economic Theories 
 
 Figure 5.1 shows a number of descriptive elements summarizing  
motivational theory and the three categories of economic wage theory.  Workers are 
seen within motivational theory as distinct individuals and are sometimes classified 
by different types, such as high achievers, and others, as goal directed individuals.  
Within the neoclassical wage theory workers are seen as a homogenous rational 
man responding identically to each other.  Information is required for the rationality 
imposed by neoclassical theory.  However, within motivational theories and the 



























available or always shared.  Perceptions are built on partial information.   Much 
motivational theory explores many different drivers for motivation, while this is 
consistent with the framework for institutional wage theory it is inconsistent with 
both neoclassical theory and the incentives behind power relationships. In addition 
to being distinct individuals, workers have, within motivational theory many 
different paths to motivation (Judge, 2009).  And finally, motivational theory 
describes that factors both intrinsic and extrinsic can be the primary source for 
motivation.  The existence of multiple factors is consistent with institutional theory 
where both social norms and external rewards are recognized, but not with 
neoclassical theory where only external rewards are paramount. 
As demonstrated in Figure 5.1 Institutional Wage theory has a higher 
alignment with motivational theory than do either neoclassical or power 
relationships.   As a result the significant empirical support which has been obtained 
for modern motivational theories adds indirect support in favor of the institutional 
wage theories over neoclassical and power relationships.  
 
Table 5.1  Theory Alignment 
Economic Wage Theory Motivational Theory 
Neoclassical Theory Reinforcement, 











 In Table 5.1 each key motivational theory is assigned to the economic wage 
theory to which it is most closely aligned. There are some connections with each of 
the economic theories of wage; however there is an abundance of relationships 
between accepted motivational theory and practice with the institutional theory of 
wage. 
 Even if there were a functional relationship between the independent 
variables such as the various elements of compensation (more than wage), the 
various factors impacting job satisfaction, and a dependent variable of motivation 
(effort), there is no clear agreement on the nature of this relationship.  This is clearly 
demonstrated by the variety of theories just discussed and calls into question the 
veracity of the proposed relationship at the heart of the efficiency wage theory. 
 This chapter shows that the organizational behavior work relating to 
motivation provides both theoretical and empirical support for certain economic 
theories of wage.  The research tends to argue against the neoclassical wage theory  
because it hypothesizes that wage is weakly or even negatively related to effort.  
Also, there is a plethora of alternative input factors, other than wage, which impact  
performance to a greater degree than do wages.  The described motivational 
theories provide a strong support to the ideas proposed in institutional wage 
theory.  They conclude that a number of job design and company policy issues, as 
well as social norms and legal structure  provide significant motivational impact and 













6.1 Conclusion I 
 This study has resulted in conclusions that are different from most of the 
published work on efficiency wage.  The shirking model of efficiency wage has long 
been accepted because of the logical and appealing theoretical formulations and 
because of the indirect empirical work using supervision and industry wage 
relationships.  Efficiency wage has also been shown to be very popular in terms of 
justifying real world observations such as wage variability, sticky wages and 
involuntary unemployment. However, not all research does support the shirking 
model efficiency wage hypothesis.  In 1987 during the height of efficiency wage 
academic work Jonathan Leonard (1987) conducted a study at the level of the firm. 
This was the first study that tested the level of supervisory intensity and the level of 
wage at the firm level. The data came from a 1982 survey of 200 plants and 70,000 
employees in France. He states that "Little evidence is found to support either 
version of the Efficiency Wage Model." (p. 152) 
 Similar to Leonard’s work, this research tests the shirking model of efficiency 
wage directly at a plant level, but it does so by econometrically fitting a microlevel 
production function including wage premium as an independent variable.  The 
empirical results taken by production line, by plant, for specific years and across 





The econometric results are backed up by the management survey (Chapter 4) and 
by the body of organization behavior work (Chapter 5).  As a result the first 
conclusion that can be drawn for this research is: 
Conclusion I. There are production environments and time periods for which the 
shirking model of the efficiency wage theory does not hold. In these cases increased 
wage does not result in additional production. 
 This conclusion challenges not only the efficiency wage theory but calls into 
question several very important elements of the neoclassical paradigm.  If efficiency 
wage is not generally valid then why do wages include so much variability for the 
same job and same geographical location, and how do we explain involuntary 
unemployment and sticky wages?   Central to neoclassical theory is the assertion 
that the wage level adjusts and determines the size of the work force as a result of 
the labor-leisure trade off.  The size of the work force then determines the supply 
output level of production.   If labor levels are not directly tied to wage levels, then 
much of the underlying framework of neoclassical theory is suspect.  As a result, the 
equilibrium adjustment process (using wage level changes) is also called into 
question. 
 Empirically, the result of this research is only applicable to the specific 
locations and dates of the study. However, there is some evidence that similar 
results are more general and are not simply limited to the specific case study in this 
research, as is shown by the wide spread work from organizational behavior 





results such as the research by Jonathan Leonard which challenge the core efficiency 
wage hypothesis.   
 
6.2 Conclusion II 
 The results of the survey (Chapter 4) highlight that wage policy was both 
intended to help avoid unionization and also that it was quite effective in doing so.  
The intent to avoid unions is consistent with the private ownership culture 
identified  in Chapter 4.  Union advocates have identified what they call the "free 
rider" problem of nonunion employees receiving benefits for which their union 
counterparts bargain.  In this case the "free rider" problem is demonstrated by   
management having an incentive to match high union wages and avoid the 
organizational and power issues associated with a union.  Booth  (2004) has 
explained that the "free rider" problem is a reality despite the documented wage gap 
between union and nonunion workers.   And paying high wages has been 
documented as a practice for nonunion companies in avoiding union organizing 
(Ohingra, 1969).   While measurements around the union and nonunion wage gap 
vary, the range over the time period of this study is 15.5% (Blanchflower, 1999) to 
25% (Bratsberg & Ragan, 2002).   The wage premiums included in this study range 
from 16% to 60%.  These premiums would clearly be effective in countering the 
need for union pay at 15% to 25%.  However, because they are often so much higher 
than the union premium, this argument cannot justify the full amount of the wage 
premiums in this study.  Clearly other motivating factors also contribute to the 
premium pay.  While avoiding unions was not the top item in the survey in terms of 





consideration in setting pay policy.  And in terms of effectiveness, management 
clearly viewed the high wage as more effective in avoiding unions than any of the 
other objectives associated with premium pay.    
Conclusion II.  Management considered their desire to avoid unions as a motivator in 
setting the premium pay.  They viewed the premium pay as very effective in avoiding 
union organizing. 
 The power the employees had to threaten a union was a key motivator for 
premium pay as suggested by the power relationship wage theory.  During the 
1990s the influence of unions in U.S. private companies was reduced and there was 
increased labor insecurity due to globalization, especially within manufacturing. 
This change represented a shift in power within the labor employer relationship and 
per the power relationship wage theory would lead to a reduction in premium 
wages.  This is consistent with the results of the management survey which report 
that premium pay was increasingly seen as less necessary. 
 
6.3 Conclusion III 
  For Mars, the strong cultural environment seems to be the dominant factor 
influencing overall wage levels and policy.  This is backed up by the discussion of 
private ownership and company objectives and culture in Chapter 4 which 
enumerated their influences on wage setting policy. The strong influence of the 
cultural environment is also supported by the management survey where there is a 
strong management view that culture played a large role in determining pay policy. 
The eight survey questions about institutional arrangements (2,3,4,5,9,10,11,12) 





management believes that pay policy has been very effective in supporting the 
cultural objectives. 
Conclusion III.  At Mars, the cultural and institutional environment provides the 
dominant factors influencing wage policy and practice.  
 This conclusion is consistent with and supportive of much of the work within 
institutional wage theory.   The corporate culture leads to the development of 
corporate policy which establishes the firm employee relationship.  This leads to the 
implicit firm employee contract which guides wage policy and employee 
satisfaction, engagement and effort.  
 
6.4 Conclusion IV 
 In Chapter 5 the organizational behavior work relating to motivation 
provides both theoretical and empirical support for certain economic theories of 
wage.  This support tends to argue against the neoclassical wage theory because the 
organizational behavior work hypothesizes that wage is weakly or even negatively 
related to effort.  In addition, these theories provide a plethora of alternative input 
factors that would impact performance even more so than wages.  While challenging 
the neoclassical theories of wage the motivational theories do provide a strong 
support to the ideas proposed in institutional wage theory.  They conclude that a 
number of job design and company policy issues, as well as social norms and legal 
structure will provide significant motivational impact and as a result largely 
determine employee effort and even participation in the work force.  These factors 





also consistent with the kinds of things that the institutional wage theory 
hypothesizes determines wage. 
Conclusion IV. Motivational theory provides a strong body of theoretical and empirical 




 The conclusions of this research have important implications for both 
managers of employees and executives who set corporate policy.  In addition there 
are policy implications for government agencies and legislative bodies that attempt 
to influence wage practices. 
 If firms are to achieve efficient output, they need employee effort.  Employee 
effort cannot be achieved without a significant investment in culture and 
institutions designed to support motivation.  Wages alone are a poor motivator, and 
as demonstrated are only loosely connected to effort. The motivational forces of 
wages alone are unlikely to overcome any negative impacts of institutional 
frameworks or social contracts.   Managers and corporate policy implementers must 
dedicate significant strategic effort in areas such as job design, team empowerment 
and other cultural engagement issues if they are to elicit employee effort.   
Corporations must also make sure managers are trained to support the 
development of effective cultures and employee engagement.  Corporations should 






 Government agency and legislative bodies often set policy to regulate labor 
markets and establish wage levels.  In doing so these governmental institutions 
should look at managing the institutional “rules of the game” rather than supporting 
the efficiency ideals of a purely laissez-faire approach.  As demonstrated in this 
research, with the challenge to neoclassical wage theory and the support of 
institutional wage factors, a focus on institutions such as minimum wage, work rules 
and tax structures can provide a stronger influence on wage development and 
income distribution than the market.  Given a supportive cultural environment these 
institutional factors can also provide greater motivation and elicit increased 
employee effort and production than can market wage mechanisms.   Governments, 
if they choose to, can also implement policies that support the development of 
market structures that favor the characteristics of firms which pay high wages.  
These characteristics are things such a product market concentration, capital 
intensity, unionism and overall size of the firm.  Governments can also implement 
policies which lead to the balkanization or reunification of the various labor markets 
relative to licensing and training requirements as well as promoting mobility. 
 
6.6 Additional Research 
 
 Four questions requiring additional research come out of this study. 
First, this study was limited to four plants in four geographies.  Additional 
research should be done to broaden the base of these results and prove more 
general conclusions.  This additional research could be done at a plant or company 





be done on an industry or market wide area if direct productivity comparisons were 
identified such as small cities with similar output and production technology. 
Second, given a tendency for the effort relative to wage to experience 
diminishing returns and become flat and because output related to effort will be 
also experience diminishing returns and become flat, it can be argued that these two 
curves combined  (O=f(e(w))) could result in a large horizontal relationship 
between wages and output.  If this were the case it could make efficiency wage 
theory ineffective.  This possibility is discussed in Appendix E. Efficiency wage 
theory requires the relationship of increasing output to wages so that the wage-
effort relationship can be maximized (see the Solow condition in Chapter 2).  
Empirical tests of these relationships would provide additional understanding of 
efficiency wage theories and the wage output relationship. 
Third, a motivational model could be built in multidimensional space with 
dimensions defined by factors of motivation.  Into this space a budget constraint and 
an indifference curve could be placed. The budget constraint would show the trade 
off in costs between various motivating factors (wage and nonwage).  The 
indifference curve would show the level of motivation achieved with different mixes 
of the motivational factors.  The slopes of the curves would determine what mix of 
factors should be employed to maximize motivation given the budget constraints.  
Empirical research around the slopes of these curves would be helpful in 
understanding how to maximize motivation. 
Fourth, institutional factors are broad and varied. Most economic work on 





unionization rates and public policy. Research should be conducted to determine at 
a firm level what policies impact wage and motivation.  This could include the 
significant cultural examples highlighted in the Mars, Inc. discussion in Chapter 4.  
Among others these included private ownership, the desire for long-term employee 
relationships, a paternalistic and egalitarian organization,  a desire to accept and 
focus on technological improvements, a working relationship between owners and 
employees and a serious desire to avoid unions.  The stylized facts relating to the 
institutions and culture of highly motivated organizations would provide a road 
map to further understanding of motivational theory and to improving motivation 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX C  
 
 
ALTERNATIVE TEST WITH 
 






C1 -Testing the Wage Premiums 
 
 In this alternative test all 10 years of production data will be used.  In order to 
match the 10 years of production data, estimates will be needed for 6 years of payroll 
premiums. The premium data for 1993, 1994, 2000 and 2001 are obtained from the BLS 
and the Mars payroll system.  The data for 1995-1999 and 2002 are straight lined 
between the observed data points. All four production models  are run with this data.  The 
models are assessed in the same two ways as in Chapter 3 where the test relies only on 
observed data.  The first is for overall enhancement: Does the model including wage 
premiums have better accuracy and fit? The second is for individual assessment of the 
premium itself: Does the coefficient of the premium make logical sense and is it 
statistically significant?  These two assessments will allow us to conclude that wage 
premiums do or do not help us explain production output. 
 The production models fit in Chapter 3 using the full 10-year fitting will be used 
as the base models. All models will be run in logarithmic format and fixed effects will 
utilized.  Wage premium is included as a percentage above the base wage. 
 
C1.1 Cobb-Douglas Test 
 The base model covering the 10 years of data has an R squared of 90% and an 
overall F test of 80.03.  The calculated coefficients and significance are shown in Table 
C.1. The model run with three factor inputs including wage premium is structured as 
follows: 
Ln (Volume) = Ln(technology) + αLn(Capital) + βLn(Labor) + µLn(Wage Premium) + ε 












Table C.1  Cobb-Douglas 10-Year Base 
 Coefficient t statistic 
Capital .698 8.15 
Labor .458 9.04 
 
It has the following results: 
The model including wage premium  has an R squared of 91% and an overall F test of 
54.75.   The calculated coefficients and significance are shown in Table C.2. 
 From an overall perspective the model is not improved.  The slight increase in R 
squared is explained by the added variable and the reduction in the overall F test shows 
that there is a higher chance that the model is not significant. 
 However from the individual assessment of the premium we learn that most.  The 
negative coefficient is counter intuitive. It implies that as wage premium increases then 
output declines.  The coefficient is also not significantly different from zero. 
 Using the 10 years of extrapolated data with the Cobb-Douglas comparison we 
cannot conclude that wage premiums significantly influence output levels as the 
efficiency wage theory proposes. 
 
Table C.2 Cobb-Douglas 10-Year Wage Test 
 
 Coefficient  t statistic 
Capital .767 8.07 
Labor .435 8.33 









C1.2 Additive Model Test 
 The additive model assumes that factor inputs are perfect substitutes.  In the 
efficiency wage model which we are testing wage premiums are not a substitute for labor. 
Instead they enhance the labor and encourage additional effort.  Rather than adding on 
wage premiums as a separate independent variable, labor will be multiplied by the wage 
premium percent. This will show a labor amplified by wage premium as the substitute for 
capital. This model augmented to include wage premiums is as follows: 
Ln(Volume) = Ln(Constant + αCapital + β(Labor*Wage Premium)) 
The base for the additive model run on the 10 years of data results in: 
An adjusted R squared of 99.3% and a residual deviation of  36.5.  The resulting 
coefficients are as shown in Table C.3. 
After including the premium wages the model results in: 
An adjusted R squared of 99.2% and a residual deviation of 48.33.  The resulting 
coefficients are shown in C.4. 
 
Table C.3  Additive 10-Year Base 
 Coefficient  t Statistic 
Constant -2.896 6.47 
Capital .669 25.4 
Labor .0204 4.3 
 
 
Table C.4 Additive 10-Year Wage Test 
 Coefficient t Statistic 
Constant -3.175 -5.91 
Capital .705 26.9 





 From an overall perspective the model is not improved, with slight negative 
adjustments to the residual deviation and the adjusted R squared. And while there is no 
specific coefficient for premium wage the coefficient for headcount (which now includes 
premium wage impact) is smaller and less significant. 
 Using the Additive model comparison with the 10 years of extrapolated wage 
premium data we cannot conclude that wage premiums significantly influence output 
levels as the efficiency wage theory proposes. 
 
C1.3 Translog Test 
 The translog model is a more complicated model with squared terms and cross 
products. To include wage premiums will require a three-factor model which is expressed 
as follows: 










+B8Ln(Capita)l×Ln(Wage Premium)+B9Ln(Labor)l×Ln(Wage Premium) 
 The base model, run as before but with only the 4 years of data results in the 
following: 
An overall R squared of 91.9% and an overall F Test of  43.88.  The resulting coefficients 
are as shown in Table C.5. 
After including the 10 years of premium wages the model results in: 
An overall R squared of 91.7% and an overall F Test of  24.7.  The resulting coefficients 







Table C.5 Translog 10-Year Base 
 Coefficient t Statistic 
Log Capital 1.669 4.16 
Log Labor -.5378 2.95 
Log Capital squared .0227 .38 
Log Headcount squared .206 4.95 
Log Cross product -.233 2.83 
Constant -1.247 2.05 
 
 
Table C.6  Translog 10-Year Wage Test 
 
 Coefficient t Statistic 
Log Labor -.546 -2.7 
Log Wage premium .856 1.42 
Log Capital 1.63 3.85 
Log Labor squared .193 4.53 
Log Wage premium squared .114 .69 
Log Capital squared .005 .07 
Log Capital X Labor -.21 -2.48 
Log Capital X Wage Premium -.076 -.92 
Labor X Wage Premium -.066 -.59 
Constant -.719 -.96 
 
 
 From an overall perspective the model is not improved, with slight negative 
adjustments to the R squared and the overall F Test. And while there is no single 
coefficient for premium wage, the coefficients are all now less statistically significant.  
None of the 4 coefficients which include wage premium are significant.  An F test on the 
four coefficients which contain wage premium together gives  F (22,167) = 9.75 which is 
significant but its significance can be attributed to labor and capital which are significant 
in both equations.  As a result we conclude that there is no increased statistical 
significance by adding wage premium into the equation. 
 Using the Translog model comparison we cannot conclude that wage premiums 





C1.4 Constant Elasticity of Substitution Test 
 The Constant Elasticity model also requires a slightly different form with three-
factor inputs.  The model including wage premium is expressed as follows: 
  ln         ln      
  
   
 ln                                 
The base model, formatted as previously derived with the ten years of data results in the 
following: 
An adjusted R squared of 99.55% and a residual deviation of -62.84.  The calculated 
coefficients and statistical significance are as shown in Table C.7. 
 After including the premium wages from the 10 years including the extrapolated 
data the model results in:  An adjusted R squared of 99.55% and a residual deviation of -
63.79.  The calculated coefficients and statistical significance are as shown in Table C.8. 
 The models result in almost identical R squared and residual deviations.  
 
Table C.7  CES 10-Year Base 
 Coefficient t Statistic 
Adjustor 1.32 4.91 
Scale .1518 18.25 
Weight to capital .912 32.24 
Rho 1.15 4.95 
 
 
Table C.8 CES 10-Year Wage Test 
 Coefficient  t Statistic 
Adjustor -9.03 6.72 
Scale 1.209 5.34 
Weight to capital 368 Na 






 However, the model does not fully solve and some of the coefficients do not make 
sense.  The original model was solved with only six iterations, but the model augmented 
with the wage premiums took 1173 iterations and could not calculate a t statistic for 
capital weight.  Even then the weighting on capital was an unreasonable 368% and the 
weighting on headcount was 37% resulting in a weighting on wage premium of negative 
404%.  The weighting coefficients are not reasonable and if they were they would imply 
that wage premium had a negative impact on production which is counter to the 
assumptions of efficiency wage. 
 Using the CES model comparison we cannot conclude that wage premiums 
significantly influence output levels as the efficiency wage theory proposes. 
 
C2 Test Conclusion 
 This alternative test using the extrapolated 10 years of data results in the same 
conclusions as the test in the body of the research. Given the consistent results across all  
four models we are forced to rely as much on the preponderance of evidence as on the 
depth of a more satisfying individual test. The conclusion of the tests is that this specific 
data sample does not provide any support for the idea that premium wages increase effort 


































 The standard assumptions
6
 underlying neoclassical production theory are not 
underlying universal hypothesis and place few limits on the form of mathematical 
expression of the production function.  This leaves us with endless possibilities of the 
possible function  y=F(X1,X2,..) permitted within the theory. 
 Several of the more popular production functions would include: 




  as a two input form with capital and labor.  
Additional inputs are sometimes added on such as human capital.   Usually "a" is 
representative of technology changes which impacts output as a scaled factor of the 
inputs.  In the classical Cobb-Douglas form the exponents add to one which insures that 
the equation has constant returns to scale.  But other structures are also possible including 
diminishing and increasing returns to scale. A key feature of this mathematical form is 
that the inputs can function both as partial complements and substitutes.  
2. Leontief form:  This form is usually shown as Y = min( αK, βL….).  This form will 
allow a different production output impact for the various inputs,  however an increase in 
one input will not impact output unless it is the constraining input.  The resulting 
production function will have one slope based on α/β over the entire length of outputs. 
3.  Additive form:   This form is usually shown as Y =αK + βL….  This simple form 
implies that the inputs are perfect substitutes. 
4. Translog production function  Ln Y = Θo +_βK Ln K+ βL Ln L+ βM Ln M+½ βKK Ln 
K2 + βKL Ln K Ln L + βKM Ln K Ln M+½ βLL Ln L2 + βLM Ln L Ln M + ½ βMM Ln 
                                                 
6
 Per Chambers (Applied Production Analysis, Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press 1988) 
these would include: Non-negative and real inputs, single values for all possible combinations of inputs, 





M2.     This function has the benefits of being flexible. It has linear and quadratic terms.  It 
can also be approximated by a Taylor series (Khalili, 1999). 
5. Constant elasticity production function.  Y= A(αKγ+(1-α)Lγ) (1/γ) 
This form has the benefit of being able to accept a variety of amounts for the elasticity of 
substitution between the inputs. The Cobb-Douglas form  limits the elasticity of 
substitution to a constant of 1. 
 Finding the appropriate mathematical model can be based on theoretical constricts 
or on empirical econometric fitting.  The appropriate theoretical constricts can be 
identified between the production functions by looking at among other features the 
following elements: 
 Variability in input proportions: Can the firm reach as certain level of output with 
various selections of input or will a specific input set be required to achieve Y’?  Also 
does the mix required of various inputs change as output changes or is the proportion 
fixed?  This production function features will help in selecting which mathematical form 
is consistent with the production technology. 
 Return to Scale: if a form will have constant returns to scale if it is linear, or the 
sum of exponents equals 1.  If the highest order term included for all inputs is second 
(squared) then the form can have increasing or decreasing returns to scale (but not both) 
based on whether the sign of the term is positive or negative. If any function will produce 
increasing, decreasing and constant returns across the possible range of outputs then there 
must be at least a third-order term on one of the inputs (Furman, 2002). 
 Identification of inputs as substitutes and complements:  Perfect substitutes are 





Leontief form.  The other functions reflect inputs that are partial complements or 
substitutes.  
 Changes in Technology: Does a change in technology simply shift the shape of 
the production function up and down or does it twist and bend the surface shape?  A 
twisting and bending of the surface shape will have the effect of using one factor of 
production more or less intensively in relationship to the others.   This characteristic of 
the production process will help direct the selection of the mathematical model. 
Given the characteristics identified for the production process the mathematical 
properties of a production function can be specified.  These can then be matched with 








nature of inputs. 
Impact of 
Technology  
Cobb-Douglas Variable Single Partial Multiplicative 
Leontief Fix  Constant Complements Step Function 
Additive Variable Constant Substitutes Additive 
Translog Variable Multiple Partial Exponential 
Constant 
Elasticity 














APPENDIX E  
 







 A resultant condition of the efficiency wage hypothesis that has not been 
discussed is that it can support both a high road and a low road alternative to profit 
maximization.   It is important to remember that accepting the efficiency wage hypothesis 
does not necessarily require payment of wages at the high end of the efficiency curve.   
The actual profit maximizing wage will depend on the shape of the effort curve with 
respect to wage and the shape of the output curve with respect to effort.  
 The generally assumed shape for the effort curve is an S shaped curve (Stiglitz J. , 
1976).  At the low end of wage, little effort is expended.  As wages increase E’ >0 and 
effort increases rapidly in response to premium wages.  However a point is reached 
where E’’<0.  Here either the income effect of the high wage takes over, or the ability of 
the worker to increase effort diminishes.  Eventually effort is either flat or declines.  
These  relationships are shown in Figure E.1 and E.2.  
 The Output shape resulting from the effort will have a similar curve as long as the 
relationship is monotonic, i.e., additional effort results in some increased output  
  
  
 > 1.   
However, there is no reason to expect that this derivative will be constant.  As such the 
 
Effort      Output 
 
 
   Wage       Effort(wage) 






particular shape will depend on the output function itself and will likely differ from the 
Effort wage shape.  Profit will be a function of output, the revenue per output and wages 
as such: 
                (assuming that the number of employees is held constant at 1 for 
simplification)  
Given the above shapes for effort and output, this profit function will have the shape 
shown in Figure E.3. 
 This shape shows that the profit can be maximized by choosing the appropriate 
wage, which is the thrust of the efficiency wage hypothesis.  However, given that effort’s 
response to wage becomes flat and given the outputs response to effort becomes flat, it is 
very possible that the shape could also become very flat as is shown in Figure E.4.  
 A profit wage curve with a large flat section offers different opportunities to reach 
the maximum profit.  Point A and point B on the curve both maximize profit, but one 
offers much higher wages than the other.  This justifies a concept of high road, low road 
application of the efficiency wage hypothesis.  
 Usually the concept of high road low road is thought of as relating to cheap wage, 





   Wages 





assumptions above provide for identically valued output, and the same technological 
choice of labor-capital processes but still allow a firm a choice among wage rates in the 
production process. 
 With a curve shaped as in Figure E.3, a firm must figure out exactly what wage 
will provide the effort to produce the maximum profit.  While possible in the world of 
assumptions, in the real world this requires unavailable and unknowable information.  
And experimentation with different wages  over years would require that the relationships 
were static rather than dynamic. What is much more understandable is a curve such as 
that in Figure E.4 where there is a large flat section.  This can be argued for on the basis  
of the curves' asymptotic properties.  Because the effort relative to wage will become flat, 
and because output relative to effort will become flat, while both can still have some 
monotonic, however small , increasing relationship the profit to wage curve could have a 
large flat section where profit is maximized.  This could easily justify different wages by 
different firms, both trying to maximize their profit.   
 
Profit            A                            B 
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